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_____News____Palestine_______________________________________________________________
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Under
Arafat’s Yoke
The PLO leader may not be an
ideal partner in peace talks with Israel, nor an
ideal leader for Christian Palestinians. But is there any real alternative?
By Nicholas Jubber
On Christmas Eve, the Latin Patriarch Michel Sabbah of Jerusalem was traveling to Bethlehem to preside over midnight Mass in the Basilica of the Nativity, traditionally recognized as the birthplace of Christ. His van was stopped by Israeli soldiers, who asked the passengers to vacate the vehicle. While the Patriarch and his companions waited, the soldiers searched the van for a contraband item. They were not looking for an illegal substance, such as explosives or drugs, but rather, for a person: the Palestinian Authority Chairman, Yasser Arafat.
Such is the Patriarch’s close relationship with Arafat that Israeli security personnel suspected that the Catholic prelate might attempt to smuggle the Palestinian leader into Bethlehem, against the stipulation of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, so that he could sustain his tradition of attending midnight Mass.
Arafat was not in the van. He remained in Ramallah, pinned into his office compound by the Israeli tanks that were pointing toward his office windows. His seat at Saint Catherine’s (the Franciscan church adjoined to the Basilica of the Nativity) was empty, draped only in the checkered keffiyeh headwear that is his trademark. Addressing Arafat’s empty seat, the Patriarch compared “the limitation imposed on your liberty” with “that imposed on your people.” The sense of solidarity between the Christian congregation and the only Muslim leader who annually attends a Christmas Mass was reinforced by the crowd outside the Basilica, gathered under a banner that read: “Sharon destroys the joy of Christmas.”
As Palestinian Christians waved messages of support for their political leader, he addressed them on local television: “Israel,” declared Arafat, “has prevented a believer in God and peace from attending the celebrations of his people to mark the birthday of Jesus.” Father Ra’ed Abusahlia, the chancellor of the Latin Patriarchate, believes that “people were really disappointed” by Arafat’s absence. He observes that the occasion had taken on such heavy political significance that as people gathered in Manger Square, “it seemed that they were waiting for Arafat more than the Patriarch—or Jesus Christ himself.”
Arafat was also prevented from attending the celebrations as the Greek Orthodox Church observed Christmas on January 6. There too, Christian believers waited—sympathetically but vainly—for the Palestinian leader. The importance attached to Arafat’s traditional attendance at Christmas liturgical ceremonies was summed up by Dr. Maria Khoury, a West Bank resident:
It is very significant that Arafat selects to attend these services because it indicates the cooperation and unity among Muslims and Christians in a Palestinian state. If we are to maintain a Christian presence in the Holy Land, it helps when the government validates our existence.
Sharon’s confinement of Arafat had backfired. After Christmas, the Palestinian leader was arguably more popular with the Christian community than ever.
No alternatives
The solidarity between Christian and Muslim Palestinians was reflected in the
demonstrations that took place in the aftermath of Christmas. On December 31, a
“Peace and Justice March” from Bethlehem to Jerusalem led by the Latin Patriarch
attracted 3,000 demonstrators, including the Muslim mufti of Bethlehem, as well
as Palestinian National Authority representatives and two members of the
Palestinian Legislative Council. Approximately half of the demonstrators wore
caps in the colors of the Palestinian flag, emblazoned with the messages “Open
Jerusalem” and “End occupation.” When they reached Jerusalem, Israeli soldiers
forbade them entry. Only those Palestinians who possessed Jerusalem passports
were able to continue the demonstration in the forecourt outside Saint Anne’s
Church, where they mingled with Israeli peace activists and listened to a poem
by the late Palestinian Authority Minister for Jerusalem, Faisal Husseini.
In January, further marches took place in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, in cities with significant Christian populations, such as Bethlehem and Ramallah. The predominant theme of these demonstrations was the protest against the continuing incarceration of Arafat in Ramallah. Sharon argued that the confinement of Arafat under what amounted to house arrest would prevent the Palestinian leader from doing harm. Arafat protested that it was a humiliation. While the US government agonized over its future relationship with the Palestinian leader—complicated by his implication in an arms shipment seized by Israel in January and connected with Iran, and by the resumption of terrorist activities by Palestinian militants—Arafat’s profile among his own people, especially the Christians, soared.
One of the principal reasons that Arafat enjoys such widespread support among Christians is that—as Canon Niam Ateek, president of the ecumenical theology center Sabeel insists—he is “a symbol of Palestinian liberation.” However, a more disturbing reason is the lack of viable alternatives. Although Ariel Sharon dismissed Arafat as “irrelevant” in December, the Israeli government, like the Palestinian population, has been unable to identify anyone else with whom it can do business.
Hamas and Islamic Jihad
The most popular political groups outside the Palestinian Authority are Hamas
and Islamic Jihad, both of which base their ideologies on strict Qu’ranic
principles. Both groups have also been associated with recent terrorist
activities. Their enthusiasm for Islamic law and for armed struggle tend to
separate them from their Christian neighbors.
According to “Abdullah,” a representative of Hamas at Birzeit University in the West Bank, Hamas does not discriminate against Christians. “We have lived together always as students, partners, and friends,” he says. “There is no difference between us.” In fact, he insists that many Christians support Hamas because they agree with its “ideology of resistance.” But most Christians are more ambiguous. “Christian Palestinians consider Hamas and Jihad as two Palestinian political parties who struggle against occupation,” explains “Maha,” a Christian Palestinian journalist based in the West Bank; “however, Christian Palestinians are against killing innocent people.”
This is not the only source of disagreement. Many Christians fear that a Qu’ranic system of government would reduce them to the “dhimmi” status that they experienced under the Islamic caliphate until the British Mandate of 1922-48. Although some Arabs would argue that the Islamic system was more generous in its treatment of religious minorities in the Middle East than some of the governments in Europe, Christian Palestinians argue that religious discrimination of any kind has no place in the 21st century. “If I have to be a dhimmi,” protests Maroun, a Christian in Ramallah, “then I will say they have to give me two bodyguards for protection. Because this system will be as bad as the occupation.”
However, while many Christians fear the imposition of an Islamic legal system, others complain that there is currently a woeful lack of any real system whatsoever. Expressing the fear among many Christians that the US air strikes on Afghanistan might alienate them from some Muslim Palestinians, Latin Patriarchate priest Father Majdi al-Siryani commented: “We do not have a strong rule of law here, and there are ignorant people who could use it against us.”
According to “Maha,” an incident occurred on January 31 that emphasized the lack of an effective legal framework in the Occupied Territories:
A Muslim was killed by a Christian in Ramallah as a result of a quarrel between them at the checkpoint of Qalandia, on the road to Jerusalem. Twenty stores belonging to Christians were destroyed and five houses were set on fire. Arafat ordered the national and preventative security agents to contain the dispute. While the rule of law came very late on that day, they should have prevented all that from happening, and Arafat lost his chance to prove how he can bring the rule of law here to reality. The Christian killer was arrested after his crime, and now the murdered man’s family demands revenge. Such cases are being solved in the traditional way, apart from the law.
When the authorities fail to provide a satisfactory legal system, individuals decide to dispense justice themselves. According to Palestinian psychiatrist Eyad as-Sarraj, this is symptomatic of a trend in the Occupied Territories toward “tribal identification.”
There have, however, been occasions when Arafat has been seen to act on behalf of Christian communities. One of the main reasons cited by the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper for his reshuffle of top positions in Bethlehem—including the posts of governor and chief of police—was the persistence of complaints by local Christians. Two Christian girls had been murdered at the end of last August, when a rumor circulated in Bethlehem that Christian women were welcoming Israeli soldiers into the area. After the killings, Christians in the city bitterly complained about the lack of police protection.
And in fact, the low standard of legal procedure in the Occupied Territories is only partially attributable to Arafat. The Palestinian Authority is manacled by its dual status. On the one hand, it is recognized as a legitimate government spawned by the Oslo Peace Process of 1993. On the other hand, it is the mouthpiece of a self-styled “resistance” against military occupation. When that dual status is seen against the mosaic of forms that have characterized the intifada—from economic boycotts and international diplomacy to suicide bombs and shopping-mall shooting sprees—the institution at its heart is pressed from every side.
Arafat has not made things easier for himself, creating a network of an estimated 120 departments, all directly answerable to him, and complicating internal Palestinian politics even further by a “divide and rule” policy toward his own subordinates. Consequently, conflicting interpretations emerge from this labyrinthine bureaucracy to shape the Palestinian Authority’s treatment of Christians.
The Latin Patriarch argues that there is a high level of “rapport” between Christians and Muslims in the Occupied Territories. “This rapport,” he claimed (in a speech in Germany on November 1, in his capacity as President of Pax Christi International) “at the level of the authorities, Arafat, and all the established institutions—is good; there is a special respect for the Church, a particular esteem of Arafat for the person of Saint Peter and for the Holy See.” David Parsons of Jerusalem’s pro-Israeli International Christian Embassy disagrees. He insists that “most Christians would secretly prefer to live under Israeli rule” because of what he brands as Arafat’s “Islamic agenda.”
Christians within Israel
Recent events also suggest that Arab Christians within the established territory
of Israel are no more satisfied with the authorities on their side of the Green
Line. The most inflammatory inter-religious dispute of recent years has taken
place in Nazareth, Israel’s largest Arab city. The fracas erupted in 1999 over
the construction of a mosque in the shadow of the Basilica of the Annunciation,
the largest church in the Middle East and the site where Gabriel visited Mary to
herald the birth of Christ. Christian leaders argued that the mosque, named
after the nephew of Saladin (the conqueror of the Crusaders in the 12th
century), would restrict access to the basilica, undermine the integrity of the
third most important Christian site in the Holy Land, and prevent their plans to
build a communal plaza open to both Muslims and Christians. Although most
Nazarene Muslims agreed, an influential group called “United Nazareth” insisted
that construction of the mosque must go ahead. Riots broke out in late 1999, as
30 Christian shops were ransacked and 64 Christians injured, with little
intervention by the Israeli police.
Commenting on the violence, the Latin-rite Bishop of Nazareth, Giacinto-Boulos Marcuzzo, complained: “The one who is stronger, who is more violent, is the winner.” But Bishop Marcuzzo claimed that there was an even more sinister issue at stake. “It’s not about the relationship between Christians and Muslims,” he argued, “nor even about the mosque itself. This is a political issue. It is perpetrated by a very small group of Arabs collaborating with the Israelis. Their aim is to divide the town and divide the Arabs.”
Significantly, Yasser Arafat (as well as the Islamic Supreme Council in Jerusalem) opposed the construction of the mosque, on the grounds that it would disrupt national unity. According to “Maha,” “Arafat and his advisors and also PA leaders work hard to bridge any gap that would occur among Christians and Muslims, as they believe that they hold the responsibility to protect this Christian minority in order to gain acceptance and support from the international Christian world, particularly the Vatican.” It was precisely this unity with which the Israeli government was accused of interfering.
In a statement issued on November 28, less than two months before the Israeli government halted construction of the mosque (subject to a review), the heads of the Holy Land’s churches (including the Latin Patriarch and the Franciscan Custos of the Holy Land) explained their point of view:
The mosque the (Israeli) Government approves for construction is not welcome to the Muslim religious and national authorities themselves, either in the Holy Land or elsewhere in the world. The government approval and encouragement for the building of an unneeded mosque right in front of one of the holiest shrines of Christendom—to which access is already all too difficult and uncertain—is an ill advised plan of certain Israeli political circles, who are making use of a marginal group of Muslims in order to sow division between Christians and Muslims in Israel, and among Muslims themselves. We specifically recall that leading authorities in the Muslim world have warned against this, even as they have expressed their criticism of this project, and of its divisive intent and effect, and their solidarity with us.
Government interference
This was not the only time that the Israelis have been accused of meddling in
Christian affairs. While the Latin Patriarchate enjoys an independence
guaranteed by the Fundamental Agreement signed between the Vatican and the state
of Israel in 1994, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate enjoys no such privilege.
This was made quite clear last summer when the Israeli government employed
legislation dating back fifteen centuries to the Byzantine Emperor Justinian, in
an abortive attempt to bar two candidates from the election to the office of
Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Jerusalem. One of them, Metropolitan Ireneos of
Ierapolis, was ultimately elected. (Some commentators have suggested that
Israeli opposition turned out to his advantage.) After his election, Patriarch
Ireneos publicly affirmed his intention to support Palestinian rights; although
he also wrote to the Israeli government to assure them that the patriarchate’s
avowed policy of neutrality would remain unchanged. However, relations between
the new Orthodox Patriarch and the Israeli government have failed to improve,
judging from an Israeli ban imposed on two Orthodox priests who had been
appointed to attend the service of prayer for religious dialogue in Assisi on
January 24.
In fact, while Christian leaders complain of Israeli attempts to divide and rule them, their public statements regarding the Arafat regime are typically much warmer. It is a sign of this “tilt” toward the Palestinian leadership that, before his journey to Bethlehem on Christmas Eve, the Latin Patriarch visited Arafat in his office, along with Patriarch Ireneos and other heads of Christian churches, repeating a gesture that they had made only a week earlier on the Muslim festival of Eid al-Fitr. According to Father Ra’ed Abusahlia of the Latin Patriarchate:
When we arrived, another group composed of the higher Islamic Council in Jerusalem was there for the same purpose. Therefore we met together, and it was very beautiful to see both Christian and Muslim leaders in the same hall for the same purpose. It represented the national unity inside the Palestinian society, because we really feel that we belong to this land and this people as Arabs, Palestinians, and Christians at the same time.
Political leaders are quick to endorse this concept of national unity, citing historical antecedents. Marwan Barghouthi, the controversial chief of Arafat’s party, al-Fatah, in the West Bank, has a plaque in his office that replicates the wording of a 7th-century accord. Known as al-Udah al-‘Omariyah, this agreement provided a guarantee of Christian rights, granted to the Patriarch Sophronius by the Muslim Caliph Omar soon after his conquest of Jerusalem in 638 AD. When Sophronius invited him to pray in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, Omar refused, pointing out that this might encourage Muslims to convert the church into a mosque. Barghouthi regards the plaque as a symbol of the religious tolerance of Palestinian society: “Fatah is a nationalist movement,” he adds, “we are not Islamic or religious.”
This is an important issue for Palestinian Christians, for whom a secular national identity facilitates their inclusion in national unity. However, the Franciscan Custos of the Holy Land worries that this is not the case. “The Palestinian statutes are based on the fundamental laws of Islam,” he says; “this is very troublesome for Christians in the Holy Land.” But the Custos concedes that Arafat balances Islamic and Christian concerns; it is after his departure, he warns, that the situation could be “very difficult” for Christians.
The composition of the Palestinian Legislative Council apparently supports the impression that Arafat treats Christians favorably: six seats out of 88 are reserved for Christian candidates—a ratio that guarantees Christians a representation that is three times their proportion of the Palestinian population. (There is also a seat for the tiny Samaritan community in the Gizrim Mountains, whose number is estimated by the Jerusalem-based Bridges for Peace organization at 600. They consider themselves the true descendants of the children of Israel and claim to possess the oldest known manuscript of the Torah, produced 13 years after the death of Moses. Their numbers do not warrant a seat in the Legislative Council, but the fact that they are represented at all is a clue to Arafat’s political agenda.) The evident pluralism of the Legislative Council makes an important political statement to the outside world. The Christians are the most significant minority within that pluralist framework, and this is the principal reason that Arafat has courted Christian figures in recent years; foremost among them the Pope.
Exploiting the Pope?
Arafat has met the Pope ten times since the Oslo Peace accords of 1993.
According to David Parsons of the International Christian Embassy, “No world
leader visited the Pope more times in the last five years than Arafat.” Parsons
argues that the Pope has been exploited by Arafat’s political agenda. He points
out: “When Arafat visited the Pope a month before his pilgrimage (in March
2000), he said Jesus was the first Palestinian, and the Pope was the successor
of Peter, the Palestinian pope.”
But while it is certainly true that Arafat set the scene in terms that favored his own cause, the Palestinian leader was hardly alone. Israeli and Palestinian political leaders alike did their best to exploit the Pope’s pilgrimage. While Israelis welcomed the visit by John Paul II to the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum and his prayer at the Western Wall, Palestinians celebrated his endorsement of United Nations Resolutions (such as UNSCR 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory), his visit to the Dheisheh refugee camp, and his acceptance of a gift of Palestinian earth from a small child. For both, the international profile of the papacy offered an opportunity to underline their own arguments and to augment their own credibility.
For the most part, the Pope has managed to avoid partisan declarations regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict, speaking in broad terms about peace and reconciliation. However, he has repeatedly insisted on recognition for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
The Pope has also advanced a specific proposal regarding the final status of Jerusalem, which is enshrined in the agreement signed with the Palestinian Authority in February 2000. The Vatican appealed for a “special statute” for Jerusalem, with “international guarantees.” This outline is not irreconcilable with either Palestinian or Israeli aspirations regarding the city, since it does not directly address the question of whether Jerusalem can be the capital of either or both states. The plans advanced by the Holy See apply principally to the holy places and the spiritual dimension of the city. But the particular vision embodied in that February 2000 document has subsequently been embellished by more specific proposals from Rome, in which the Vatican proposes that Jerusalem should be maintained as a “corpus separatum” under the watch of international observers, and the holy places should remain outside any political jurisdiction.
The relationship between Arafat and the Vatican appears to be a case of mutual necessity. Arafat needs the legitimacy proffered by association with the Pope; the Pope needs to maintain good relations with the Palestinian leadership in order to protect the status of the Christian holy sites and the Catholic population.
As Arafat’s regime continues to
wobble, it is from the Christian community that he finds one of his most
reliable sources of support. With his secular ideology, he appears to offer the
Christians the promise of a regime in which they would enjoy more positive
conditions than those offered by his rivals outside the Palestinian Authority.
But Arafat is far from ideal. “We would have liked to see a different beginning
of the Palestinian state,” says Canon Ateek, “with more democracy.” Under any of
the choices—whether Arafat’s al-Fatah party, Hamas, or a continuation of the
Israeli occupation—that remains an elusive dream.
Nicholas Jubber is a free-lance
correspondent who specializes in coverage of the Middle East; his articles from
that region have appeared frequently in CWR.