Ariel Sharon’s election victory on February 6 may have been a landslide. He did receive a massive 63 percent of the vote, compared with his rival Ehud Barak’s paltry 37 percent, and thus he enjoyed the largest winning margin in Israeli history. But the vote is not a mandate for Sharon to do as he wills. Much as Sharon and his aides might believe he won the election, the widely held belief among ordinary Israeli voters is that Barak lost it.

A remarkable 45 percent of the electorate, at a loss for a suitable candidate, opted not to vote. People had lost confidence in Barak, who had tried and failed to reach a compromise with the Palestinians throughout a 21-month tenure which had culminated in extensive and continuous violence. The security which the Oslo peace process, and later the Camp David talks, were supposed to provide had been shattered. Few analysts now expect Sharon to be any more successful, but as the Israeli author Tom Segev pointed out, “This was a case of the Israeli people punishing Barak for failing.”

Among the eligible voters who abstained from this election were the vast majority of Arab Israelis—a crucial 12 percent of the electorate—who boycotted the polling booths in protest against the 13 Israeli citizens of Arabic descent who were killing during demonstrations last October. Barak’s last-minute apology for the deaths failed to win the Arabs over. These disaffected voters include some 120,000 Christians, who constitute 2 percent of the population. Father Raed Abusahlia, chancellor of the Latin Catholic Patriarchate of Jerusalem, believes that “less than 15 percent [of the Christian Arabs] voted for Barak.” The rest stayed away from the polling places.

Had he been allowed to stand for election as leader of the Labor Party, Shimon Peres would have received strong Arab support. “They have said that clearly,” says Father Abusahlia. “But even if they voted for him he would not have won, because they are only 12 percent.” Peres, the 77-year-old former prime minister and Nobel Peace Prize winner, is expected to assume preliminary control of the Labor party, in the wake of Barak’s resignation, and may accept the role of foreign minister under Sharon’s leadership. But there is a world of difference between the two elder statesmen of the Knesset: one (Peres) a “dove” who enjoys support in Arab circles, the other (Sharon) a hard-line “hawk” who barely bothered to court the elusive Arab vote.

Sharon did successfully woo moderate Israelis, with his pledge to “put security first,” and cemented the support of militant Jewish voters by pledging to crush Palestinian resistance. Whereas Barak was, under his proposed peace deal with the Palestinian National Authority, prepared to disband many of the settlements built in the occupied Palestinian territories, Sharon perceives these settlements as integral to Israel’s security, and has promised that all of the settlers can remain in their homes. Over one million Russian immigrants have flocked to the Holy Land since 1990; a large proportion are housed in settlements. They now make up one-sixth of the Israeli population. With few exceptions, they voted for Sharon.

Sharon’s election bodes ill for peace efforts in the region. Although he said relatively little about his approach to the peace process during the election campaign, what Sharon did say carried ominous undertones. The Likud leader sees it as “a major concession” to the Palestinians that he is committed to “not re-conquering Nablus and Jericho,” two West Bank towns that are now under Palestinian control. Rumors abound about his proposed plans for East Jerusalem; will he remove police and security forces from the area, or close down the buildings occupied by the Palestinian National Authority—even those that provide housing, education, and health services for East Jerusalemites?

Perhaps most worrisome is the fact that Sharon has acquired a house in the Muslim quarter of the Old City, from the window of which hangs a large Israeli flag. This, like his visit to the Temple Mount (known to the Arabs as Haram ash-Sharif) last September, is widely seen as provocation, and has compounded concern within the Palestinian community. The house is a symbolic statement of Sharon’s pronounced desire to alter the demography of the occupied territories. “There is a feeling here that Sharon may further hurt the economic and infrastructural fabric of the West Bank,” fears Toine Van Teeffellen, a Christian lecturer at Bethlehem University.

Christian families in Nazareth are already unable to extend their land holdings, since the available property has all been bought up by Jewish developers. If the Arab families grow, they have to move out of this traditionally Arab town. Under Sharon, such problems are expected to increase. The sense of fear is summed up by Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator: “If he sticks to his election propaganda—with no right of return, no withdrawal of Israeli forces until there’s peace, no compromise on Jerusalem, and no removal of settlements—then God help all Israelis, and God help all Palestinians.”

A Man With History
Sharon’s experience of the Arab-Israeli conflict spans the entire history of Israel. In 1948, the year that the Jewish state was established, he was a platoon commander. Five years later, he had founded Unit 101, nicknamed “The Avengers,” whose raids into Bedouin and Palestinian-Jordanian territory included the killing of 69 Arab civilians, many of them women and children, in Qibya. Further excursions included a raid on Egyptian soldiers in 1955, in which 38 were killed; Egypt’s President Nasser then concluded that peace with Israel was impossible. Over three more decades of military activity, Sharon commanded military operations with euphemistic titles like “Pacification of Gaza” and “Operation Peace in Galilee”—the latter culminating in 1982 with the massacre of 2,750 Palestinian refugees by Christian Phalange militiamen in Lebanon.

Sharon was found “indirectly responsible” for the carnage in Lebanon by the Israeli Supreme Court, and his military career seemed to be finished. Indeed, given the anger of Israeli demonstrators who clamored for his resignation and public censure, it would have seemed that he had no further part to play in the nation’s public life. But decorated Israeli soldiers have a knack for finding their way to high office, and now Sharon—like Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, and most recently Ehud Barak—has joined a long list of Israeli prime ministers whose military record has earned them as much praise from their compatriots as concern from human-rights groups.

Sharon’s political career started in 1973, when he helped establish the Likud Party—just prior to leading a boisterous army squadron to the Suez Canal, where they trapped the Egyptian army in the Sinai peninsula. He completed a brilliant year by earning a seat in the Knesset. He has subsequently held the cabinet positions of Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Construction and Housing, using both positions to help establish a permanent Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza strip through Jewish settlements. Between 1990 and 1992, he masterminded the biggest settlement building drive in the occupied territories. In his drive to maintain and even expand the Jewish settlements—which is certain to be an important facet of his program as prime minister—he has enjoyed considerable support from far-right groups like Gush Emunim, with whom he has links and whose beliefs include the notion that Jews should not be held accountable for the murder of Gentiles.

Sharon was Benjamin Netanyahu’s foreign minister from 1998-9, and when Netanyahu fell from grace Sharon succeeded him as chairman of the Likud Party. It was in this capacity (and immediately after Netanyahu implied he would return to the political arena, suggesting the possibility of a leadership challenge) that Sharon visited the Haram ash-Sharif, or Temple Mount, with an impressive military escort in September 2000.

Sharon’s visit to Haram ash-Sharif—widely seen as a deliberate effort to provoke Palestinians—was met with the same sort of fierce criticism that has dogged the new Israeli prime minister throughout his public career. In 1953 the United Nations Security Council and US State Department alike condemned his actions in Qibya. In 1955 he was reprimanded for supporting blood revenge against Arabs who killed Israeli soldiers. In 1956 he was accused by his own officers of sending men to their deaths for his own glory. In 1972 he was criticized for inhumane treatment of Arabs in Gaza. In the 1970s there were charges that he was involved in inciting a Palestinian coup d’etat in Jordan. But after the incident at the Temple Mount last September, Sharon was saved by his rival. Barak refused to criticize the gesture. In fact, having been warned of Sharon’s plans, Barak refused to forbid them.

So now Israel is faced with the supreme irony: the man whose actions incited the intifada which has threatened Israeli security has now been given the job of restoring that security and leading the peace process. He inherits a land embroiled in guerilla warfare that threatens at any moment to escalate into a much more serious regional conflict. The rhetoric from extremists on both sides simply serves to fan these flames, with the Islamic Jihad threatening, “Our operations will continue and increase;” and Jewish settlers, convinced that Arabs should “go to hell,” confidently predicting that Sharon will “fight the Arabs” along with them. How Sharon will respond to this reciprocal racism—whether he will seek to quash it or incite it—is an issue on which his political survival may depend.

A Wounded Process
The peace process that Sharon inherits is a categorical failure, yet it came tantalizingly close to success. The Oslo framework had lost its supporters’ confidence long before Sharon visited the site of the Al-Aqsa mosque. Through the terms of two very different Israeli leaders, Netanyahu and Barak, the lines of public policy had remained unchanged on essential issues. Observes Mark Ellis, director of the Center for American and Jewish Studies at Baylor University: “Under both, Israeli settlements expanded. Under both, land continued to be confiscated. Under both, real sovereignty was denied to Palestinians.” Israelis said that the blame for the lack of progress in the peace talks should be attributed to Yasser Arafat, for his failure to curb terrorism; and to the belligerence of other Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

According to Yossi Alpher, an Israeli strategic analyst, “Oslo as we know it is over. Something in the spirit of Oslo on an interim level is what Sharon has in mind—but based on conditions I think Arafat will find unacceptable.” In 1984, Sharon stated on national television: “The Jews have all the rights over this country. The Arabs have all the rights in this country.” In accordance with strict Zionist principles, he was rejecting the legitimacy of an autonomous Palestinian state. There is little to suggest that this hard-line attitude has been softened.

On the positive side, Shlomo Ben-Ami, Barak’s foreign minister, claimed recently that the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were “closer than we’ve ever been before” to reaching an agreement. They were, he said, “only two weeks away” from an accord, but “simply did not have enough time” to wrap up the “remaining issues” prior to the election. Now the Palestinians are reportedly anxious to “take up negotiations where they left off.”

However, Sharon is not ready to pick up the negotiations where his predecessor left them. He has refused Palestinian demands that he honor earlier proposals. And Barak has agreed that Sharon should not be constrained by his (Barak’s) proposals. The reluctance of US President George W. Bush to become intensively involved—after the last-minute efforts of outgoing President Bill Clinton—could also pose an obstacle. US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said that the proposals that were on the negotiating table at the close of last year would die at the end of Clinton’s term, unless newly adopted by both the Israelis and Palestinians: “The ideas and parameters that were discussed in the last few months were President Clinton’s parameters and therefore, when he left office, they were no longer a US proposal or a presidential proposal,” Boucher explained. In this atmosphere of diplomatic uncertainty, if the US continues to hang back, alternative candidates such as Egypt, France, or even Russia, may attempt to take over the mantle of Middle East peacemaker.

The earliest indications from the new Israeli leadership suggest that the terms of any potential agreement would be radically different. Barak was prepared to concede 95 percent of the land on the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian government; Sharon is prepared to offer less than half that territory. Barak was prepared to compromise on the question of refugees returning to the homes that they had lost in the wars of 1948 and 1967, considering repatriation of 130,000 refugees from Lebanon; under a Sharon government, none will be allowed to return. Barak was prepared to offer parts of East Jerusalem, and half of the Old City; Sharon has always maintained that Jerusalem is “the eternal and undivided capital of Israel” alone.

Even Barak’s proposals, advertised by his political supporters as “more than the most enlightened leader of Israel has ever offered,” fall considerably short of the requirements of established international norms. United Nations Resolutions 194 and 242 demand Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, and the cessation of development of Israeli settlements.

In fact, Sharon may shelve negotiations with the Palestinians altogether, both because he insists that the Palestinians must put an end to all violence before coming to the negotiating table, and because he puts higher priority on peace negotiations with Syria and Lebanon.

The Palestinians have always argued in favor of an international inquiry into the current unrest; the Israelis have argued it is unnecessary. The Palestinians want an international protectorate force in Jerusalem, a move which Israel vehemently opposes. The recent visit by Mary Robinson, the UN Human Rights Commissioner, produced some scathing public statements about excessive use of force by Israeli troops, but those statements seem to have produced very little reaction from the international community. A fact-finding mission by an international team headed by former US Senator George Mitchell was cut short by the Israeli government after the inspectors visited the Temple Mount/ Haram ash-Sharif without first informing the Israeli authorities.

Recently the European Union demanded that Israel’s “remaining closures on the Palestinian Authority be lifted” and implied that sanctions could be imposed against Israel if this request was ignored. Palestinian leaders might argue that such statements come rather late in the day, since the Palestinian economy has already lost over $2.5 billion since the start of the intifada. Nevertheless, the EU statement represents a noteworthy shift in international opinion, and many residents of the occupied territories believe that shift could become much more emphatic if Sharon maintains his hard-line stance. “You know where you stand”
There is, paradoxically, a feeling in the occupied territories that Sharon’s victory might serve the cause of peace in the long run. Unlike Barak or Netanyahu, the new Israeli leader is seen by his Palestinian counterparts as someone with whom “you know where you stand.” Sharon does as he says, and many Palestinians feel that this forthrightness will contribute to an atmosphere of trust—if and when the two sides return to the negotiating table. Furthermore, Sharon’s candor will, the Palestinians anticipate, make Israeli intransigence more transparently obvious to the world community, thus encouraging more international attention to the peace process. Father Raed Abusahlia comments: “Sharon might do us a favor, in the sense that he will show the world the true face of Israel.”

The Israeli political situation that Sharon inherits has never been more fractious. The final memories of Prime Minister Barak, squirming before a multi-pronged assault in the Knesset, showed the complexity of that complicated body. Fifteen parties are represented in the Knesset, including the ultra-Orthodox Shas, the Arab Democratic Party, and Yisrael Beitenu, which represents Russian immigrants. Sharon’s Likud party, the second largest representation, has only 19 seats out of 120. He therefore needs to form a coalition with parties representing at least 42 other members of the Knesset, and he must build that coalition by the middle of March, in time to present his policies and budget for parliamentary ratification. Given the tendency for coalition partners to bring their own ideological baggage—forcing concessions in exchange for their parliamentary support—this is an unenviable task.

And of course Sharon also inherits an intifada that he may, or may not, have started. Certainly his actions last September left him open to criticism from all sides. His provocative visit was a contravention of strict rabbinical law, which forbids a Jew from visiting the Temple Mount for fear of stepping on the Holy of Holies. Palestinians accused him of an act of gross disrespect, since his large military guard seemed to them an outrageously aggressive display of force. But Sharon’s defenders insist that he was concerned about reports of Palestinian trespasses on Jewish archeological sites, and they charge that Arab politicians like Faisal Husseini incited a mob to respond to Sharon’s visit with acts of organized terrorism. What the visit did highlight, at least, was the importance of the holy places, and particularly the Temple Mount/Haram ash-Sharif, in the peace process.

The Temple Mount is owned by the Islamic Waqf, the religious trust affiliated with the Al Aqsa mosque; but Israel exercises political control of the area. It is, therefore, symbolic of the political and religious complexity of the region. Some Arabs believe that there is a conspiracy to reduce this complexity. Palestinians have been questioning the apparent ease with which American visas have been granted to Christians who wish to emigrate from the Holy Land. “It is almost as if they (the US) don’t want us here,” complained one Christian from Beit Sahour, a town from which 56 Christian families have fled over the past five months. “It would be much simpler for them if this was simply a Jewish-Muslim conflict.”

In this difficult atmosphere, the Catholic Church finds herself awkwardly placed and open to criticism. When the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem attempted to explain the sources of the violence in the region at a recent seminar in London, he was accused by a leading British rabbi of supporting terrorism. “The Church, of course, does not support violence,” insisted Patriarch Michel Sabbah. “Peace, or peaceful ways, can give birth to more peace.” Still he insisted that “any form of oppression, of illegitimate military occupation, is a form of violence and a direct invitation to violence.” The Patriarch, who aligns himself politically with the Palestinian Authority and—as a Palestinian representing a predominantly Palestinian congregation—with the Palestinian cause, fears that “a kind of guerrilla warfare has become an everyday event, in the face of contempt for international law and the marginalization of the holy places.”

The Patriarch himself is often accused of laying too strong an emphasis on relations with Muslims at the expense of Christian-Jewish dialogue. But he argues that the Muslims are his compatriots, among whom he and his people hope to live in a future independent state. “A Jewish-Christian dialogue,” he says, “should deal with the daily relations between Christian Palestinians and Jews of Israel; that means with the issue of justice and peace and equality among all, based on religious values as well as on positive legislation.”

In the existing circumstances, relations between Christians and Jews (like relations between Muslims and Jews) are fraught with tension. But the Patriarch has the undoubted support of the Holy See. And the Vatican itself has become the leading international advocate for Palestinian Christians.

(At first glance it would seem logical that the Greek Orthodox Church would be the loudest voice in support of Palestinian Christians, since Orthodox believers outnumber Catholics in the Holy Land. But the Greek Orthodox Church has lacked an established leader, since the death of Patriarch Diodoros I in December. Moreover the Orthodox Patriarchate is suffering through a financial crisis, which has forced the sale of a great deal of property—including sales to Jewish buyers, which has been criticized by some Palestinians as a betrayal of their cause.)

The diplomatic role of the Holy See in the Holy Land is based on two different agreements: the Fundamental Agreement with Israel, signed in 1994, and the Basic Agreement with the Palestinian National Authority, signed in 2000. The two documents do not always match, because they are based on different premises. Although both agreements call for a display of respect for freedom of religion, and for the promotion of tolerance and understanding, the Fundamental Agreement makes no commitment to a “Special Statute” for Jerusalem, while the Basic Agreement does so in its preamble. The Basic Agreement calls for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on UN Resolutions; the Fundamental Agreement makes no reference to international law. The 6-year gap between the signing of these pacts goes some way to explaining such differences. And Pope John Paul II left no doubt about the Vatican’s position when, in his January address to the Vatican diplomatic corps, he said: “There should be no resignation in the face of the persistence of injustice, the contempt for international law or the marginalization of the holy places and the requirements of the Christian communities.”

A widening chasm
Since the latest intifada began, the views of divergent groups in the Holy Land have drifted ever further apart.

Palestinians accuse Israelis of military excesses and the murder of innocent children. They point out that some of these killings have been filmed, and some children have in effect been executed for throwing stones. Illegal dum-dum bullets have been found at the site of Arab-Israeli confrontations. Olive groves, the source of income for many Palestinian farmers, have been deliberately destroyed—either by Jewish settlers or by Israeli soldiers alleging “security reasons.”

On the Israeli side, the intifada is interpreted as Arafat’s game, which he can stop and start at will. Groups like the Fatah Tanzim have been cited for shooting at Jewish settlements from Palestinian houses. Israelis charge that the Palestinian children are being used as human shields, and doubt that the Palestinian leaders have any real interest in peace.

Each side, receiving its information from its own media outlets, hardens its belief in its own rectitude, and the consequent conflicting interpretations make the middle road all the more difficult to find.

The Palestinians cannot accept a deal which does not give them East Jerusalem. The Israelis regard Jerusalem as their “eternal and undivided capital.” Sharon’s election, in a situation that is already so tense, seems likely to stoke a raging fire. Father Abusahlia believes:

We have more months of suffering in front of us, not only for Christians but for all the Palestinians and the Israelis as well. There will be more closures, aggressions, and economic crisis. The absence of tourists and pilgrims in the holy places will be a real disaster, because almost all the hotels, restaurants, souvenir shops, even the holy places have been empty for more than four months.