questions answered

by wm. b. smith

Conscience Confusion

    Question: A parishioner sent me Catholics for a Free Choice quoting Fr. Richard McBrien that if a Catholic is convinced that his conscience is correct in spite of a conflict with the moral teaching of the Church that person not only may but must follow his conscience rather than the teachings of the Church. How would you respond?

    Answer: The quote, I believe, is from Frances Kissling, Chair of Free Choice and a fanatical abortion advocate. That her group self-describes as “Catholic” is a media tactic. That group has as much to do with Catholicism as science fiction has to do with science.

    Her authoritative source—R. P. McBrien’s Catholicism (1980) pp. 1004-1005—is not really inaccurate. The McBrien opus (Catholicism) in various editions (‘80; ‘94) has raised and caused many problems. This book never received an imprimatur and some high level Church authorities (Committee on Doctrine of N.C.C.B.) asked for but never received corrections and improvements.

    The great deficit of McBrien’s Catholicism is doctrinal minimalism—what’s the least I have to accept to call myself Catholic. Doctrinal minimalism always comes with its first cousin—moral minimalism which turns out to be moral relativism. McBrien’s stated methodology and ecclesiology are so broad and fluid that the true, normative moral teaching of the Church appears as just one element among many in the formation of conscience.

    For example, he writes that no one is Catholic who deliberately “excludes all reference” to official Church teaching (p. 1005). Not a helpful reference that since to exclude deliberately “all” reference to Church teaching really describes a genuine apostate.

    On what he calls the positive side of conscience formation, McBrien suggests an antecedent “attention and respect” (N.B. attention not adherence!) toward Church teaching “without prejudice to other sources: one’s associates (unnamed); the findings of science (unnamed); the Bible; and the writings of theologians” (p. 1005). The theologians are also unnamed but the reader can certainly presume the many he cites approvingly in his book rank higher than the moral teachings of the Church he finds so much fault with.

    This method deconstructs the formation of a correct Catholic conscience since the Sacred Sources (Sacred Scripture; Sacred Tradition and Magisterium) are relativized to the status of information or mere points of view indistinguishable from other non-Sacred points of view, i.e., one’s associates and other human findings and writings. This is a very attenuated ecclesiology since it rests more on a civil-political model rather than a religious-ecclesial one. Sacred Scripture is, of course, revealed by God; Sacred Tradition is guided by the Holy Spirit; and, the Church is endowed with a charism to teach in Christ’s name (Luke 10:16). These are indeed “sacred sources” whose teaching is normative and directive of right conduct and necessary for the correct formation of a correct Catholic conscience.

    It is true one can act on a certain conscience. Indeed, a conscience that is both subjectively certain and objectively correct is per se the only true norm for acting. But, a conscience that is subjectively certain and objectively erroneous is only per accidens a norm for conduct.

    An erroneous or mistaken conscience is not a true source of genuine rights because it would generate a “moral right” to do moral wrong and that would be moral nonsense. Catholics (anyone) should be wary of expressions claiming “absolute supremacy” for autonomous or individual conscience. Any claim that does not give first place nor first mention to the truth about the good is bound to mislead. When the truth does not get mentioned first (or at all) it is hard to avoid the message that the truth does not matter (moral relativism).

    A Catholic whose conscience is in conflict with authentic Catholic teaching does have a status—it is an erroneous conscience (CCC ##1790; 1791). But an erroneous conscience is an aberration. The first and most pastoral response to an erroneous conscience is to correct it, not to celebrate or absolutize it. Error celebrated can only lead to future and further errors.

    Conscience, after all, does not invent the truth, at its best conscience seeks to discern and detect the truth. Again, in the context of conscience-formation,McBrien’s Catholicism tells us the Church never claimed “to speak infallibly on a moral question” (p. 1004). Yet, the Council of Trent’s absolute rejection of divorce is certainly infallible teaching on a moral question; consider as well the main principles of the 10 Commandments in view of Ad Tuendam Fidem (5/18/98)—surely many infallible teachings on moral questions. It seems to me both odd and misleading that an author wants to foster a subjectively infallible conscience while always denying any infallible moral teachings.

    Sometimes too much fire and too little light is focused on the kinds and degrees of infallibility while neglecting the obvious and available moral certitude that obtains with true and certain moral teaching. Sometimes arguments about the precise degrees and grades of infallibility cause some writers to miss the moral forest while looking for an infallible twig.

    No science, including moral science, should pretend a level of certitude that it often does not offer. Does that leave us bereft of true and certain moral guidance? Of course not! Consider the true teaching of Vatican II: “. . . In the formation of their consciences, the Christian faithful ought faithfully attend to the sacred and certain doctrine of the Church. The Church is, by the will of Christ, the teacher of truth. It is her duty to give utterance to and to teach authoritatively, that Truth which is Christ Himself, and also to declare and to confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order which have their origin in human nature itself. . . .” (Dignitatis humanae, n. 14).

    Curiously, Fr. McBrien’s Catholicism does quote (p. 1005) that passage from the Vatican Council, but the Council of course makes no mention of one’s associates or the findings or writings of other non-sacred sources.

    There really is a moral duty not merely to inspect or review the truth as if the true moral teaching of the Church were just “input” or mere information along with other human input and information. Rather, true teaching is to be sought and adhered to because it deserves and requires the religious assent of our soul.

    Thus again, in McBrien’s Catholicism we are told on two particular moral matters that we are to act on an “informed conscience” (p. 1006). Notice, there is no mention nor requirement by him that our conscience be correct or true, only that it be informed.

    Then in two applications we are told: (1) re artificial contraception to take Church teaching “seriously into account” (p. 1027); and (2) re homosexual practice to take Church teaching “seriously into account” (p. 1033). Nowhere is the teaching of the Church said to be true and normative for conscience formation; rather, everywhere Church teaching is said to be something to be taken “into account” —it is for the deciding subject to decide the truth while also taking into account all the usual suspects: one’s associates and the findings and writings Fr. McBrien happens to approve of.

    Instead of that low-test ecclesiology of the civil-secular kind, much to be preferred is the religious-ecclesial framework that the Vatican Council actually taught: “Bishops, teaching in communion with the Roman Pontiff, are to be respected by all as witnesses to divine and Catholic truth. In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with religious assent of soul” (LG, n. 25; also cf. Cns. 752; 753; and CCC #892).

    Notice the moral obligation is to form a correct conscience in accord with the truth and adhere to that truth with religious assent of soul. Divine and Catholic truth is not just mere human input you take “into account,” or give a pious nod to; it is both normative and directive for living a morally sound life. Truly, error can occur in the judgment of or in the application of the truth, but error is not normative and it always misdirects.

Sick Days

   Question: Is there any justice obligation for those who take off work days for which he is paid for “sick days” when in reality he is quite well. Since some are allowed a number of “sick days” each year some say this is only lying, not a justice question.

    Answer: To my mind, “only lying” never improves any situation. Consider the sober treatment of “lying” in the Catechism (##2482-7). Significantly, the Catechism teaches that every offense against justice and truth “entails the duty of reparation” (#2487).

    Now, it is true that some contracts and employment policies provide for a certain number of sick days, some even provide for “personal days.” It seems to me that when one claims a sick day when he is quite well he should convert that to a “personal day” as a form of reparation.

    Where the “personal day” option does not exist, it seems to me this is still a case of fraud and not simply lying. Whether or not grave matter is involved would depend upon particular circumstances.

    I suppose in theory all are in favor of just and fair labor relations. Their very purpose rests on and should foster just and trusted employer-employee relations. But, an attitude of what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable will not foster nor deepen just and trusted relations. Again depending on gravity, some form of reparation (open or secret) should be applied.

    Your precise question does not seem to be directly addressed in the approved authors. However, I believe that G. Grisez is correct that legal systems typically, and reasonably, define theft narrowly but as a moral category it should be defined more broadly (Living Christian Life 2 [1993] p. 824).

    Grisez has the courage to be concrete, arguing that many acts not usually considered theft are theft morally: “In general, all obtaining of money, goods and services by fraud or unjust coercion involves the same injustice as theft: falsifying something’s value in selling it, lying in order to obtain a more favorable contract, taking bribes or kickbacks, padding expense accounts, overstating the hours one has worked, charging for work not done . . .” (p. 825).

    Grisez also mentions what few others ever mention: “Workers should work steadily during working hours. Many people, employees or not, commit themselves to a certain schedule for work but fail to fulfill it. They begin late and quit early, take extra time off for rest periods or meals, socialize excessively during working hours, purposely work more slowly than is reasonable, shirk the work to which they have committed themselves while occupying themselves with other work, and so on. Such practices are a serious waste of time for any worker, and for employees, they are usually a serious injustice to the employer” (LCL 2 [‘93] p. 759). While the author notes this can admit of poverty of matter, employees should not measure themselves by a lax standard for personal performance but by a just standard by putting themselves in the employer’s place and applying the Golden Rule (p. 759).

    The Catechism, as a universal document, is less detailed but it describes as illicit: “. . . work poorly done, tax evasion, forging checks and invoices . . .” (#2409).

    Further, “Promises must be kept and contracts strictly observed to the extent that commitments made in them are morally just. . . . All contracts must be agreed to and executed in good faith” (#2410). “Without commutative justice, no other form of justice is possible” (#2411).

    Thus, lying within or about a good faith contract offends both truth and justice.

Please address questions to Msgr. Wm. B. Smith, St. Joseph’s Seminary, Dunwoodie, Yonkers, N.Y. 10704.   

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