| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
questions answered
by wm. b. smith
Question: In your opinion, do the bombing attacks on Iraqi targets fulfill the traditional just war criteria?
Answer: The traditional elements of what is called the “just war” doctrine are listed in the Catechism #2309, along with ## 2308-2314. First, we note the introduction of this teaching in the Catechism: “The strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force . . .” (CCC #2309—emphasis in the original, especially “defense”).
In ways, the Catechism’s presentation of the elements or conditions of “just war” theory is overly concise; i.e., the space is small, examples are not given, and some terms are not fully explained. (This is not a criticism of the Catechism but simply to note its style—it is not a multi-volume encyclopedia.)
The U.S. Bishops in their 1983 Pastoral, “The Challenge of Peace,” (5/3/83) nn. 85-110, present a much fuller explanation of the “just war” criteria with several examples and contemporary applications.
For reasons I do not understand, the secular media has been largely silent and offered something of a “free pass” on the morality of the US-British attacks begun in December of 1998.
Personally, I do not consider Saddam Hussein a nice person; rather, he is a vicious dictator, sometimes aggressive and always shrewd, who does not hesitate to murder his own in-laws. His plots and policies have brought great suffering on his own people, make most of his neighbors understandably nervous, and he has contributed nothing to world peace and stability: no runs, no hits, all errors! Unfortunately, this dangerous character is not unique in this world and perhaps it is because he is a dangerous character—with a proven track record not just a potential one—that the secular media find no sympathy for him or in him.
While all of this is, I believe, true of this dangerous character, nevertheless, being a dangerous character is not one of the elements of the “just war” criteria.
Shortly after the December 1998 US-British air attacks, Archbishop T. McCarrick, head of the NCCB Committee on International Policy, properly raised the question: “These military strikes unduly risk violating just war criteria.”
Further, Archbishop E. O’Brien, Archdiocese for Military Services, issued a statement (12/30/98) sent to all Catholic chaplains noting that military personnel “are not exempt from making conscientious decisions” (statement in Origins 28:30 [1/14/99] p. 525).
The statement asked the American administration to initiate no further military action in the Middle East. In concert with officials of the Bishops’ Conference and the Vatican, Archbishop O’Brien gave voice to serious questions as to the justifiability of this military action: “whether just war requirements for non-combatant immunity, proportionality and probability of success could be met in this situation.”
The Archbishop correctly notes that one who judges an action to be in violation of the moral law is bound to avoid that action; whereas, in the face of uncertain evidence the individual is justified in following the presumably better informed decisions of superiors. The last point is in accord with the Catechism’s teaching about the importance of “the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good” (CCC #2309).
The air strikes, we are told, were designed to avoid any and every civilian target which, if so, would surely reduce the probability of noncombatant injury. But, the proportionality and probability of success are serious questions here.
What is “success” here? Some commentators spoke of “degrading Iraq’s weapons systems.” Sound-bites like “degrade weapons” or “send a message” are highly ambiguous and hardly informative. If a policy goal is not stated with some clarity, it is very difficult to offer a judgment on “probability of success” when there is no clear definition of what success is.
In addition, conventional just war criteria address the question of called by “competent authority” (cf. NCCB, “Pastoral” [1983] nn. 87, 88; and obliquely, CCC #2309). It is not clear that these actions are under the mandate or sanction of the United Nations, and clearly, they were not mandated nor sanctioned by the U.S. Congress.
The just war criteria are, after all, conditions for “legitimate defense by military force” (CCC #2309). I may be wrong in this assessment, but these air strikes (acts of war) can just as reasonably be described as aggressive acts rather than strictly defensive ones.
Perhaps since the Gulf War of 1991, the media has contributed to the public perception that “air strikes” are some kind of a video game, arranged and scripted for the evening news. When pilots are over 10,000 feet above targets and cruise missile launchers hundreds of miles away, this may not engage people as the conventional combat films and images of W.W. II, Korea, and Vietnam. However, the bombs and missiles are destructive and they do land somewhere.
A brutal dictator’s unjust invasion of Kuwait and his destructive exit from same surely can qualify as aggressive acts, but it seems to me, apart from actual or truly imminent aggression, we do not have the moral right to bomb rulers and regimes we do not like, even when there is a good reason not to like them or trust them.
Management of ectopic pregnancy
Question: I read of a “shelling out” procedure for ectopic pregnancy. It said this leaves the fallopian tube in place and intact, arguing that it is the more pro-life and pro-fertility procedure. Is this a direct abortion?
Answer: I believe it is a morally direct abortion and that it is not a legitimate application of the principle of Double Effect as some have argued (for a summary of opinions, cf. J. E. Foran, M.D., in Linacre Quarterly 66:1 [February 1999] 21-28).
Factually, according to the Centers for Disease Control there has been a very large increase in ectopic pregnancies in this country: from a 4.5 rate per 1,000 in 1970 to a 19.7 rate in 1992. The CDC attributes major increases to chlamydia and other sexually transmitted diseases that can and do scar fallopian tubes. A number of pelvic inflammatory diseases (PID’s) cause serious infections in fallopian tubes and ovaries—especially affecting the sensitive lining of the tubes known as the endosalpinx. It is almost impossible for ectopic tubal pregnancy to happen without some preexisting disease or irregularity of the endosalpinx.
Over the past decade, two Catholic moralists have engaged in a nuanced and pointed debate about what is and is not permissible in the moral management of ectopic pregnancies: cf. W. E. May in The Fetal Tissue Issue (Pope John Center, 1994) pp. 121-148; also, Ethics & Medics 23:3 [March 1998] 1-3; and A. S. Moraczewski in E&M 21:6, 21:8 [June and August 1996] and E&M 23:3 [March 1998] 3-4 in response to W. May.
Some estimate that about half of tubal pregnancies spontaneously resolve, but our present concern is deliberate intervention (surgical or chemical) to resolve the tubal pregnancy. In the past, the vast majority of tubal pregnancies were discovered because of the rupture of the tube, at which point it was too late to do anything except to remove the now damaged and ruptured tube with the death of the unborn a concomitant and unavoidable fact.
Currently, the diagnosis of unruptured ectopic pregnancy is possible by ultrasound or laparoscopic techniques and this earlier (i.e., pre-rupture) information raises questions of the appropriate management of intact pregnancy.
All Catholic authors agree that salpingectomy is a licit application of the principle of double effect. That is, full salpingectomy—the entire fallopian tube (together with the ectopic pregnancy) is surgically removed; or, partial salpingectomy—only the damaged segment of the tube enveloping the ectopic pregnancy is removed, and then the severed ends of the tube are brought together and sutured.
Clearly, the surgery here is on the tube, a portion of which is pathological and poses a significant threat to the health and life of the mother. The death of the unborn is foreseen but not directly intended. The improvement in mother’s health and life is not precisely caused by the death of the unborn but comes through (caused by) the removal of pathological tissue. Thus, an indirect abortion and a legitimate application of double effect.
But, different from salpingectomy is salpingostomy—where the tube is sliced longitudinally directly over the ectopic who is extracted with forceps or gentle suction with some appropriate instrument. The unborn is thus detached from the tubal wall and removed (death-dealing).
Similar to salpingostomy, but non-surgical, is the chemical administration (systemically or injected at the site) of Methotrexate (MTX). Methotrexate is a folic acid antagonist developed over 40 years ago as a chemotherapy for certain types of cancer. MTX inhibits DNA synthesis so that normal implantation enzymatic activity ceases. Its primary effect is on the trophoblast (the precursor of the placenta). Clearly, this is not a cancer case, the point and purpose of MTX here is to shut down (stop) the life support system of the developing child (death-dealing).
It seems to me that salpingostomy and this administration of MTX are direct abortions, and that the W. E. May analysis is correct while the Moraczewski opinion is mistaken.
Moraczewski prefers to examine the classical “fontes moralitatis” and ask specifically: what is the moral object of salpingostomy? (E&M 23:3, p. 4). He argues that the specific object and good of that act is “the stopping of the enzymatic activity of the trophoblast.” That enzymatic action would be proper and normal in the uterus but is here causing damage in an abnormal site, the tubal lining.
Thus, contra W. May, he says his conclusion is not based on the distinction between removing the embryo from the site and destroying it in situ. “It is based on stopping the destructive activity of the trophoblast by removing trophoblastic cells along with the damaged tubal tissue” (Ibid.).
However, when you do directly remove the embryo from the site, what you do (finis operis) is destroy it in situ. Neither trophoblast nor its activity is in any sense “diseased,” and thus the salpingostomy or MTX is in no sense therapeutic for or to the embryo, it is, rather, a death-dealing procedure meant to improve mother’s health and life. This violates the double effect condition (re causality) that the good effect not be caused by, not come through the evil effect. As mentioned above, tubal pregnancies don’t happen because tiny embryos do what they naturally do; almost always there is a preexisting problem in the endosalpinx from whatever cause.
Thus, I believe W. E. May is correct (with K. Flannery, S.J.) when he states that salpingectomy is a medical intervention performed on the mother; whereas salpingostomy (or MTX or craniotomy) are interventions performed on the unborn child. Moreover, the procedures are undertaken “not for the benefit of the unborn child, who is killed as a result of their use, but for the benefit of another, the mother” (E&M 23:3, p. 2).
Since the procedures are not necessary to protect the mother’s life (salpingectomy can preserve that) but allegedly to preserve future fertility, I would judge that the final condition of double effect, proportion, is also not verified here and thus is not a legitimate application of double effect and is a direct abortion.
Please address questions to Msgr. Wm. B. Smith, St. Joseph’s Seminary,
Dunwoodie, Yonkers, N.Y. 10704.
Back to Catholic Information Center On Internet's Main Periodical Page