questions answered
by wm. b. smith

War on Terrorism

Question: Does the current war against
terrorism fulfill the just-war criteria?

Corrections for Questions and Answers column that ran in the March 2002 of HPR 1) On page 69, column 2, 12 lines from the bottom: It reads: “How strong is the norm forward only with those cell lines of those already clone in? " It should read: “How strong is the norm to go forward only with those cell lines of those already done in?” 2) On page 70, column 1, 5 lines from he bottom: “On the other hand, doctors already use adult stem cells to create a host of human diseases.” It should read: “On the other hand, doctors already use adult stem cells to treat a host of human diseases.” 3) On page 70, column 2, 12 lines from the bottom, it reads: “No other human can give valid consent that deliberately arid . . .” It should read: “No other human can give valid consent that deliberately and . . .” 4) On page 70, 9 lines from the top: It reads: “True, the smallest human embryo differs from us are from us” It should read: “True, the smallest human embryo differs from us; but it differs.....” 5) On page 71, column 1, 4 lines from end of column: It reads: “ And the principled advice of the late Paul Ramsey—that the good we do will only be made concrete by some of the things we refuses to do.” It should read: “And the principled advice of the late Paul Ramsey—that the good we do will only be made complete by some of the things we refuse to do.” It should read: “complete” for “concrete” and “refuse” for “refuses.” We apologize for these errors. Charles F. Harvey, Managing Editor

Answer: As it is now, and thus far, I believe it does. As I understand it, the U.S. Bishops Conference (USCCB) supports the same conclusion (11/14/01) in their statement, “Living With Faith and Hope After Sept. 11” (cf. Origins 31:25 [11/29/01] 413-420).

This is not a conventional kind of war with a nation-state aggressor and a nation-state defender. But, it is not simply a police question either, i.e., the pursuit, arrest, trial and imprisonment of a murderous gang. Certainly, the mass murder attacks of 9/11/01 were acts of war against the United States in particular, and perhaps the West in general.

As I understand the just-war tradition and its conditions, it is fundamentally a moral framework rooted in justice and moral realism. When the adversary is not a uniformed army in the conventional sense that does not really change the reality of the situation or the justice components that can be honored or dishonored.

No sane person likes war but sanity can also be impaired by addiction to sentimentality. The pursuit of justice is an obligation of the state—indeed a moral obligation not merely a politically correct or incorrect option. A just war of defense is acknowledged by Vatican II (Gaudium et Spes, n. 79) and clearly repeated in the Catechism of the Catholic Church ##2308-2310; also see CCFC #2240. The Catechism teaches “the right and duty to impose on citizens the obligations necessary for national defense” (CCC, #2310) (emphasis in original).

The moral criteria (conditions) of the just-war teaching have been presented by scholars as a two-tier framework: first, the justice of the war-decision (ius ad bellum); and second, just-war conduct (ius in bello). While the two are closely connected (even sequential) they are not identical. Selective citation or focus on only one of the latter (conduct) without thoughtfully fulfilling the former (decision) can cause more confusion than clarity.

The war decision (ius ad bellum) calls for clear analysis on the strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force: just cause; upright intention; last resort; hope of success; proportionate or appropriate to the goal (just cause) not producing evils and disorders greater than the evil to be opposed; conducted and called by competent public authority who have responsibility for the common good (CCC #2309). Thus, the war decision must first find its possible justification in the fulfillment of these justice criteria.

Our difference between these latter (in bello) criteria and the first tier (ad bellum) criteria is that the conduct (in bello) criteria inevitably involve contingent and sometimes prudential judgments. To focus first or exclusively on the contingent can blur the political realism or drain the moral justice components of the just-war analysis. This is not the place to re-argue the passions of the 1980’s cold war rhetoric, but in my judgment, some spokesmen of just-war criteria did not state Catholic moral theory well at the time with the unintended consequence that political correctness replaced political realism and the basic moral wisdom of the just-war analysis was somewhat muddled. (For an excellent book on just-war theory—attentive both to political realism and to moral principle—confer, J. T. Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare [Yale, 1999] 259 pp.)

This answer seems to be a convolution of cautions. In ways, it is; in ways, it’s not. In the past twenty years, some official and scholarly Catholic commentary on just-war teaching has been, I think, somewhat muddled. Perhaps this was to try to accommodate political correctness, or, unprincipled pacifism, but the results of those misstatements come back to cloud what should be clear in the present case.

For example, the N.C.C.B. Pastoral of 1983 (n. 80) and its update of 1993 (n. 2) says: “The just-war tradition begins with a strong presumption against the use of force . . .” This is simply not an accurate statement of the tradition historically or theologically. In fact, St. Augustine does not begin with that presumption (City of God, 19:12) nor does St. Thomas Aquinas (ST, 2-2, 1. 40, aa. 1-4), nor does Vatican II (GS, n. 79), nor does the Catechism (## 2304, 2308), nor do the pastoral letters of the West German Bishops (4/18/84) or the French Bishops (11/8/83).

The traditional analysis, especially the first tier criteria (ad bellum) begins with justice and rights—the just pursuit and protection of justice and human and moral rights. A more accurate initial statement of the question is found in the words Aquinas attributes to Agustine: “Among true worshippers of God those wars are looked on as peace-making which are waged neither from aggrandizement nor cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of repressing the evil and supporting the good” (ST, 2-2, q. 40, a. 1).

In the same past two decades, some official and scholarly Catholic commentary has made a moral equivalence of just-war theory and strict pacifism. For example, the 1983 Pastoral asserts that just-war and pacifism are complementary (n. 74) that they share a common presumption (n. 120) but differ on how to defend the common good (n. 74). This is not only un-historical but slightly incoherent. Strict pacifism forbids the use of any force, whereas just-war theory holds that force can be justly used when certain moral conditions are fulfilled.

Clearly, just-war and pacifism do not share a common presumption against the use of force. One says it can be justified; the other says it is never justified. I cannot read that as complementary. In the tradition, the just use of force can be described as an act of virtue (justice; cf. ST, 2-2, 1. 188, a. 3) whereas strict pacifism holds the opposite conclusion and presumption.

The late R. A. McCormick, writing in the New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967) held that strict pacifism was morally indefensible. Quoting John C. Murray paraphrasing Pope Pius XII a Catholic citizen cannot refuse to give his service to the state and refuse to fulfill the duties affixed by law (NCE v. 14, p. 804). The Catechism also teaches that it is “morally obligatory . . . to defend one’s country” (CCC #2240). Surely, some humane provision in civil law can be urged for individuals who opt out of politics or for reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms at all provided, however, that they accept some other form of service to the human community (Vat. II, GS, n. 79; repeated in CCC #2311).

What McCormick wrote in 1967 was surely conventional teaching as are the relevant points of the Council (1965) and the Catechism (1992). There would have to have been a gigantic (stealth) development of doctrine to state in 1983 (again in 1993) that just war doctrine and strict pacifism really agree on fundamental principle but differ only on HOW that basic principle (just force vs. no force) is carried out.

Perhaps pastoral teaching documents, produced by committees, have to embrace conflicting compromises to get the support of all committee members. This is the way of labor-management negotiations—give some partial thing to everyone, but don’t give everything to anyone. This is the way of resolving disputes over wages, benefits and work-rules, and the same is often true of tortured but necessary legislative compromises. But this is not the way of fundamental moral principles—when you split the difference in principle of a principle, it simply ceases to be a first principle anymore.

A lack of clarity about political realism or moral principle on the first tier criteria (ius ad bellum) will come back to haunt the advocates and documents that send a muddled message.

Recent examples are not lacking. Archbishop E. F. O’Brien of the Archdiocese for Military Service wrote a clear Christmas Message (12/13/01) to Catholics in the U.S. Military accurately reflecting his support and the support of the U.S.C.C.B. (Origins 31:30 [1/10/02] p. 508).

However, that Archbishop’s Letter was preceded in the same issue of Origins by a statement (“The War . . . Must Stop”) from a group of U.S. Catholics (i.e., individuals whose organizations and titles are listed for identification purposes only)—in large part, Pax Christi and the Justice and Peace committees and coordinators of several religious orders of men and women.

This group does some selective citation from the U.S.C.C.B. statement of 11/14/01 to question and quibble with Episcopal support for the war against terrorism. They argue that the 9/11/01 attacks on U.S. cities and citizens should be dealt with by police investigations and trial before such a tribunal as the World Court at the Hague.

Significantly, however, they add: “…we invite our bishops and all Catholics to rethink the ‘just-war’ tradition and seek a new paradigm for judging questions of war and peace today” (p. 506).

Surely, there is no harm in rethinking settled doctrine or any work in progress. But, it seems to me pretty clear that prior but relatively recent statements that just-war doctrine and pacifism are really two complementary branches of the same Catholic trunk can also be rethought. They do not share the same first principle while differing only on How that principle is carried out. They differ not only in application but differ in principle at root.

In a sense, these so-called “peace groups” are consistent—they don’t include themselves in the just-war paradigm, as they call it; they ask and seek a different paradigm, i.e., a doctrine different from Augustine, Aquinas, the Council or the Catechism.

Yes, I do believe the present war against terrorism, as it is and thus far, is justified on the just-war analysis. However, I do not believe that all mentions of just-war theory accurately reflect the tradition they claim to represent.