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by wm. b. smith
Public Sinner?
Question: A young couple, both Catholics, came to be married. She is a “nurse practitioner” with prescriptive privileges who admitted prescribing contraception frequently where she worked. Given this formal cooperation in evil, I reasoned she could be married in the church validly and licitly but not fruitfully. Thus, while it appears a public sinner can receive Matrimony, it appears obvious one cannot receive the Eucharist in this state, so I said the wedding must be outside of Mass. They got married elsewhere. Some priests later said I was too strict. Comment?
Answer: If we go by the book, we must attend to canon 915 of the Code of Canon Law: “Those upon whom the penalty of excommunication or interdict have been imposed or declared, and those who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin (“in manifesto gravi peccato obstinate perseverantes”) are not to be admitted to Holy Communion” (cn. 915).
This canon 915 replaces cn. 855 of the 1917 Code that spoke of Catholics publicly known to be unworthy (“publice indigni”) by excommunication or interdict and those manifestly of ill repute (“manifestoque infames”) (cn. 855, #1). Indeed, the old (1917) code makes further distinctions and directives about public and occult approaches to Holy Communion (cn. 855, #2) which are not included in the new (1983) Code (cn. 915).
The first part of the present law (cn. 915) where excommunication or interdict have been imposed or declared is clear — such persons are not admitted to Holy Communion.
What I find somewhat problematic in your question is the quick invocation of “public sinner.” That is not precisely the language of the Code but surely what you read in those “who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin” (cn. 915).
My hesitation is, at least, twofold. First, I agree with the careful cautions of Pope John Paul II in Familiaris Consortio (11/22/81) n. 68 about the celebration of marriage and the evangelization of non-believing baptized persons. Exact criteria that define the “level of faith” of those to be married involve great risks. I realize from your question that you say they can marry validly and your precise point concerns the worthy reception of communion. But I continue to view these difficult situations as a chance to evangelize rather than to legislate. Of course, when someone rejects explicitly and formally what the Church intends by marriage that is an obstacle that cannot be avoided or admitted (FC, n. 68).
Secondly, concerning “public sinners” and/or “obstinately persist in manifest grave sin,” we have to attend to grave sin and public scandal which is the root problem for the incompatibility of the worthy reception of communion.
Surely, contraception, and temporary sterilization (pills — particularly contraceptives with abortifacient properties — are grave evils. Formal cooperation in same is also gravely wrong. But, just how “public” (or “manifest”) this cooperation in evil is, I am not so sure. I endorse fully the teaching of both St. Augustine (City of God, Bk. 21, c. 27, n. 5) and St. Thomas Aquinas (Quodlibet, VIII, q. 9, a. 15) not to propose my personal opinion on the gravity of grave matter without the positive teaching and guidance of the Church to support it.
Commentaries on the Code (old [1917] cn. 855, #1; or new [1983] cn. 915) are very clear on the first part of the canon; i.e., where excommunication or interdict have been imposed or declared. However, almost all commentaries are hesitant about declaring clearly on “manifest grave sin” or what you call “public sinner.” An example of the old caution on the old (1917) Code can be found in Woywod-Smith, v. I (1948) pp. 466-7; an example of a present caution on the new (1983) Code in The Canon Law (1995) of the British-Irish Canon Law Societies (p. 503).
The American CLS Commentary (1985) is particularly unhelpful in this regard since it states that the minister cannot assume that the sin of public concubinage arising from divorce and remarriage is always grave in the external forum (p. 653). That is an opinion recently refuted by the Holy See but unfortunately restated as an “internal forum solution to an irregular marriage” in the newly revised Commentary of CLSA (2000) on page 1110.
Indeed, the recent (6/24/00) Declaration of the Pontifical Council for Interpreting Legislative Texts is quite helpful here. The “Declaration” (for text, cf. Origins 30:11 [8/17/00] pp. 174-5) addresses and answers the question of Holy Communion and Divorced, civilly remarried Catholics and canon 915 that they are not to receive communion.
Now, while answering that particular question, the Declaration also sheds some light on a reliable understanding of the phrase (in cn. 915) “and others who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin.”
The Declaration states that three conditions are required:
- grave sin be understood objectively, not subjectively;
- obstinate persistence is an objective situation of sin that endures in time and the will of the individual does not bring it to an end without further requirements (e.g., defiance; prior warning; etc.); and
- the manifest character of the situation of grave habitual sin (Origins 30:11, p. 175).
While what you say about grave sin is true; and, what you say about formal cooperation is true; I remain unpersuaded that your example is clearly one of manifest public sin or manifestly a public sinner. Perhaps, my analysis is faulty and needs corrective improvement, but without more positive teaching of the Church, I am just not certain how “public” your public sinner is, or, how “public” is the grave public scandal.
Life and Hope
Question: Is it true that the A.M.A. forbids its members to participate in capital punishment?
Answer: Yes. The Code of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association is published by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the A.M.A. in Chicago.
The 1998-1999 edition of their Code of Medical Ethics states the following re “Capital Punishment”: “An individual’s opinion on capital punishment is the personal moral decision of the individual. A physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally authorized execution” (n. 2.06; p. 13).
This is a noble statement, especially the self-description of Medicine as a “profession dedicated to preserving life when there is hope of doing so, . . . .” This is a standard with which I agree and salute. It is my personal conviction that direct killing is no part of true Medicine and should have no legitimate place in it.
Unfortunately, a few pages prior in the same Code of Medical Ethics a very different standard begins the section (#2) on “Social and Policy Issues.” It reads: (n. 2.01) “Abortion. The Principles of Medical Ethics of the A.M.A. do not prohibit a physician from performing an abortion in accordance with good medical practice and under circumstances that do not violate the law” (n. 2.01; p. 3).
What is puzzling here is what happened to the noble profession “dedicated to preserving life when there is hope of doing so”? Why no declared space for the “personal moral decision of the individual” physician? Is it not even worthy of mention? What is “direct abortion” if not a “legally authorized execution” albeit without any hearing, trial or any due process of law?
As above, I believe “direct killing” is not and should not be any part of the practice of ethical medicine. After all, the purpose of Medicine is to cure when possible, or when not possible, at least to provide care. If there is a “consistent” ethic here, why not extend the noble profession of dedication “to preserving life when there is hope of doing so” to the millions unborn that is extended to the hundreds convicted of capital crimes?
Msgr. Wm. B. Smith
St. Joseph’s Seminary
Dunwoodie, Yonkers, N.Y. 10704
Back to Homiletic & Pastoral Review Table of Contents December 2000