questions answered

by wm. b. smith

Sinful Voting?

Answer: I find it difficult to answer that question formulated in that way. In saying that, I am not trying to duck the question, it's just that I am not convinced that the question is appropriately or decisively framed in those terms.

Pre-Vatican II manuals of theology are not of great help in this question. Many regarded voting as a "privilege" which people were free to exercise or not, as they saw fit. Not seen as a duty, there was hardly any mention of obligation. But, with the background teaching of Pope Pius XII, I believe that Vatican II greatly enhanced the obligation of voting both as a "right" and as a "duty."

To my knowledge, this was the first general council of the Church to teach this: "Hence let all citizens be mindful of their simultaneous right and duty to vote freely in the interest of advancing the common good" (Gaudium et Spes, n. 75). The Catechism (1992) repeats the same teaching: ". . . morally obligatory to pay taxes, to exercise the right to vote, and to defend one's country . . ." (CCC #2240). As a positive duty this admits of excusing causes and legitimate omissions.

Some current post-Vatican II textbooks of moral theology do consider the right and duty to vote and the possible gravity of that vote (cf. e.g., G. Grisez, Living A Christian Life II [1993] pp. 870-873; K. Peschke, Christian Ethics, II [1993] p. 605. Of these two, Grisez's is the more nuanced in understanding and speaking to the American situation).

Peschke writes in his 3rd edition (1993): "It is a civic duty and moral obligation which binds in conscience, at least whenever a good candidate has an unworthy opponent" (p. 605). In his 2nd edition (1985), Peschke wrote that refusal to vote for no valid reason would be a serious sin if the election would bring into government a regime hostile to religion and to freedom of conscience (p. 288).

Grisez argues that responsibility to vote "can be grave matter" but adequate excuses for omitting this duty can and do exist. While the duty to prepare oneself and to vote might be light matter, in principle it could be grave since the common good is very important and can surely affect many people (p. 872). Neither author frames the question in terms of a particular vote for a particular candidate.

I suspect that it is clearer to speak with certitude (and speak of right and wrong) when confronting an up-or-down referendum. For example, if a referendum vote were before us to legalize abortion, it would be gravely wrong to vote for that.

It has long been my opinion that the CDF, Declaration On Procured Abortion (11/18/74) n. 22 addresses general referenda rather than individual representatives: "Man can never obey a law which is in itself immoral, and such is the case of a law which would admit in principle the liceity of abortion. Nor can he take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or vote for it . . . ." (n. 22).

That authoritative principle (repeated in Evangelium Vitae [3/25/95] n.73) applies more clearly to referenda than representatives. One problem is, in our American scene, we rarely get a chance to cast an up-or-down vote for or against abortion (or euthanasia). Most often we vote for representatives who vote for many laws-some good, some not. Of late, it is the unelected branch of government (Federal Judiciary) that has legalized crimes against life.

Quite often government executives (presidents or governors) don't vote at all for legislation (except by veto); yet they often execute or advocate their financing and implementation. President Clinton has the unique distinction of vetoing a majority vote of both houses of Congress (1996) to keep partial birth abortion legal. Yet, he continues to say abortion should be "safe, legal and rare." Surely votes for Clinton should be at best that: safe, legal and rare.

If you can't trust a man with an innocent life, how could you trust him with your vote? And, when 60% of those voting say of the one a majority voted for that he is neither honest nor trustworthy, surely abortion is not our only problem.

It still seems to be true that about 5% of the population will vote on abortion to the exclusion of all other factors. Perhaps when assisted suicide becomes legal that percentage will rise.

To me it still seems correct to say: I don't see how a Catholic in good conscience can vote for someone who explicitly favors abortion. Of course, I have never heard an office seeker say that he or she "explicitly favors abortion." I have heard said: it's sad, tragic, safe-legal-rare and other creative forms of camouflage that I don't happen to believe, but I can't say that I am well positioned to discern the grave confusion or gross dishonesty in such claims.

Priests and bishops do not cease to be citizens by ordination. Thus, they have the same rights as other citizens to talk to, argue about or speak up for principles, programs and persons whom they believe will help or hurt the common good.

In private and public life, they have the same rights as other American citizens. In the pulpit, they should not say nor make any partisan endorsements of any kind.

As free citizens, perhaps not all other citizens will like or accept their formulation of their personal opinions. There is much two-way traffic on that street.

I myself would not formulate the question as asked: is it a sin to vote for Clinton? I don't see it as a matter of intrinsic evil; I see it as a matter of intrinsic stupidity. Fortunately, it is now a matter of past history.

For Better, For Richer?

Answer: After doing some homework, I am informed by some Catholic lawyers that prematrimonial agreements are not limited to just Hollywood and big Media types. Apparently, some young professionals (who tend to marry later) agree that what they earned and saved as singles is their individual possession and not to be nor to become common property. Others have highly detailed agreements specifying who gets to keep what, even before they have said "yes" for keeps.

Is this an intention against permanence? I have not found very much written on this by expert canonists. But, from what I read it is not seen to be an invalidating intention against marriage; but surely it is a "red flag" that deserves serious pastoral discussion and instruction before marriage.

On the one hand, no authority below the Holy See can establish a genuine impediment to marriage (canon 1075). Also, this does not seem directly to involve a "future condition" or the other important distinctions of cn. 1102. Yet, post factum, it might later serve as some kind of corroborative evidence of an intention against marriage.

There are, of course, some forms of premarriage agreement that are not so recent. European royal houses sometimes had arrangements to make sure their castles and crown jewels did not pass out of their families. Some super wealthy Americans also constructed legal trusts designed to ensure that large stocks and big properties did not pass from their grasp and control.

However, the legal life of royal types or Wall Street royals was not usually a parochial concern. My lawyer friends tell me this is much more widespread now amid the general population. The media may have hyped the Trumps and the Kennedys, but the hype has sparked the interest and signatures of a wider audience.

The first casualty here seems to be the most traditional promise: "for better, for worse; for richer, for poorer; in sickness and in health." For some, this now reads: "for better, for richer, that's healthy." This, of course, is far removed from one of the beautiful characteristics of "conjugal love" in the unread section of Humanae Vitae, where Paul VI taught: "This (conjugal) love is total, that is to say, it is a very special form of personal friendship, in which husband and wife generously share everything, without undue reservation or selfish calculation" (HV, 9).

The genuine "gift of self" to the other has been a key principle of the Conciliar (GS 24; 48) and Pontifical teaching on marriage (HV, Familiaris Consortio; Letter to Families (2/2/94) n. 11). While the language of total self-giving enjoys prominence in the literature and the ceremonies, I wonder whether the written words of these agreements do not undermine the spoken words of the intended. It's one thing to be business-like in your outlook and mentality, but the sacrament of marriage is not a business.

As above, I don't think such agreements constitute a canonical impediment, but they can and do present a pastoral problem. In health terms, it's not exactly an obstacle to commitment, but more like an aneurysm-a soft spot, a thinness that could break, bubble or bleed that commitment and thus deserves serious pastoral discussion before and not just after it happens.

Please address questions to Msgr. Wm. B. Smith, St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, Yonkers, N.Y. 10704. n