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Vatican II and Religious Liberty:
Contradiction or Continuity?
by Fr. Brian W. Harrison, O.S.
The kind of heated debates which surrounded the question of religious
liberty at Vatican Council II have once again become a prominent feature in the life of
the Church as a result of the illicit episcopal consecrations (and consequent
excommunications) which took place at Ecône, Switzerland, on June 30, 1988. For
Archbishop Marcel Lefèbvre had made no secret of the fact that, of all his various
grievances against the Council and its implementation during the ensuing time, none —
not even the liturgical question — was more fundamental than his dissatisfaction with
Dignitatis Humanae, the Vatican II Declaration on Religious Liberty.
Immediately following the rupture of June 1988, Pope John Paul II issued the Motu Proprio
Ecclesia Dei (July 2, 1988), calling for a deeper study of this and other disputed
questions, “so that the Council’s continuity with Tradition may be made as clear
as possible” (Section 4b). In my book, Religious Liberty and Contraception,1 I have
tried to show this continuity, in the context of arguing that the kind of change
represented by Dignitatis Humanae sets no precedent for the sort of real doctrinal
contradiction which would be involved in a “relaxation” of Humanae Vitae.
The Central Problem – and Some Inadequate
Solutions
If in fact the conciliar teaching on religious liberty is compatible with
the Church’s traditional doctrine, as we maintain, then why have many Catholics
remained unconvinced of this, even after many years in which many books and articles have
appeared purporting to trace a harmonious development between the nineteenth-century
encyclicals and Dignitatis Humanae?
The problem can be briefly stated. Both Gregory XVI in Mirari Vos (1832)2 and Pius IX in
Quanta Cura (1864)3 condemned the demand for “liberty of conscience” as
“insanity” (deliramentum). The latter pontiff also condemned, in the Syllabus
accompanying Quanta Cura, the proposition that, “In the present day it is no longer
expedient that the Catholic religion should be held as the only religion of the State, to
the exclusion of all other forms of worship.”4 His successor Leo XIII insisted that
“lying opinions . . . should be diligently repressed by public authority, lest they
insidiously work the ruin of the State.”5 All the pontiffs before Vatican II did
indeed teach that sometimes governments can and should “tolerate” non-Catholic
manifestations of belief; but as recently as 1953 Pope Pius XII affirmed that religious
error has “no objective right” even to exist, much less to be propagated
publicly.6 Earlier in that year Pius XII had in fact approved a new Vatican concordat with
Franco’s Spain: it confirmed the existing Spanish law which stipulated that although
nobody was to be disturbed on account of his religious beliefs, or in the private practice
of his own religion, “[e]xterior ceremonies and other manifestations of non-Catholic
religions will not be permitted.”7 How then, it might well be asked, can traditional
doctrine be reconciled with Vatican II’s clear implication that religious liberty for
non-Catholics as well as Catholics, even in public, is a requirement of their human
dignity? The conciliar Declaration’s central affirmation reads:
The Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men should be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every human power so that, within due limits, nobody is forced to act against his conscience in religious matters, nor impeded from acting in accordance with it, in private or in public, alone or in association with others. The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom is based on the very dignity of the human person as known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.8
Since the promulgation of Dignitatis Humanae over a quarter century ago, a
good many works have been written purporting to reconcile this teaching with traditional
doctrine. In this writer’s opinion, however, the most influential attempts at
harmonization have been too facile and superficial. And they have been rightly rejected by
Archbishop Lefèbvre and other traditionalists on the grounds that they gloss over and
dilute the severe and uncompromising statements of the anti-liberal encyclicals of earlier
popes. This has only served to harden the divisions in the post-conciliar Church, and to
contribute in no small measure to the present deplorable rupture.9
The most superficial type of apologetic would seem to be that which simply emphasizes the
gradualness of change in the Church’s attitude. Fr. Bernard Sesbouë, S.J., for
instance, writing on behalf of the French Episcopal Conference in 1986,10 argues that it
was unfortunate, though historically understandable, that the popes of the last century
failed to see the positive values in the liberalism which then presented itself in an
anti-Catholic form. However, he added hopefully,
The change in direction between Pius IX and Vatican II seems much less sharp if we
consider the slow curve marked by the teachings of Leo XIII, Pius XI, Pius XII and John
XXIII.11
One can scarcely blame the Italian “anti-modernist” magazine Si Si No No for
remarking tartly that if this “slow curve” is in fact a U-turn — a complete
reversal of doctrinal direction — then the mere gradualness with which (supposedly)
it was accomplished does nothing at all to rebut the charge that the Vatican II statement
contradicts what the popes taught a century earlier.12
At the time of the Council itself, the principal argument used to convince the Fathers of
Vatican II that the schema on religious liberty was compatible with traditional doctrine
was that the nineteenth-century popes, in condemning “liberty of conscience,”
were basically only concerned to combat “indifferentism”— the idea that one
religion is pretty much as good as the next. It could scarcely be denied that, at the
time, the popes saw this fight against indifferentism as having restrictive consequences
in regard to the civil liberties of non-Catholics. However, the relator (official
spokesman) for the drafting committee, Bishop Emil de Smedt, reassured the assembled
Fathers that this demand for wider civil liberty was condemned by Gregory XVI and Pius IX
only as a consequence of a rationalism for which the individual conscience is not subject
to any law originating in God. A liberty of cult which is based on religious
indifferentism is indeed rejected.13
The implication, clearly, is that the Church today will not really contradict the earlier
popes in approving the same degree of civil liberty which they condemned, provided only
that, in doing so, today’s Church clearly dissociates herself from any possible
suggestion that indifferentism is the rationale or motivation for this new decision.
Unfortunately, de Smedt’s argument does not stand up well to careful historical
criticism. The original denunciation of Catholic liberalism, Gregory XVI’s encyclical
Mirari Vos, was directed above all against the French philosopher-journalist H.F.R. de
Lamennais, who strongly rejected “religious indifferentism” at the level of
“the individual conscience.”14 Moreover, the text of Mirari Vos itself, while
affirming indeed that the demand for “liberty of conscience” had its historical
roots in religious indifferentism,15 does not suggest that this demand is to be condemned
only insofar as it is motivated by indifferentism. On the contrary, the pope’s reason
for denouncing “liberty of conscience” in civil society has to do with its
effects, not its causes: the spread of error, he says, endangers the salvation of souls.16
Another variety of specious “concordism” between Dignitatis Humanae and
traditional doctrine has to do with the fundamental question of how the State should in
principle relate to the Church. Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J., one of the most
influential periti at Vatican II, devoted a great deal of study to the encyclicals of Leo
XIII, which strongly affirmed the duty of the state to recognize Catholicism as the true
religion. Murray tried to make out that this aspect of Leo’s teaching was only a
historically-conditioned assumption; and that this pontiff’s only basic concern (and
hence, the only permanently binding aspect of his Magisterium in this area) was to
vindicate the freedom of the Church.17 The claim to a privileged position, according to
Murray, could therefore be discarded in principle by the modern Church, so that the
American model of separation between church and state (that is, full freedom but no
privilege) could now be affirmed in Catholic doctrine as the correct or normative
situation for any politically mature society.18
This has been widely understood as the doctrine of Dignitatis Humanae itself;19 and
Murray’s argument has been taken as providing a satisfactory harmonization between
such an idea and the traditional Catholic doctrine. In fact, the teachings of Leo XIII and
the other pre-conciliar popes cannot be relativized as easily as Murray thought unique
social recognition for Catholicism as the true religion was not seen merely as a means for
guaranteeing the freedom of the Church. More fundamentally it was seen as an intrinsic
requirement of divine law, flowing ultimately from the Kingship of Christ over the whole
creation — including the State.20
In short, the problems raised by Dignitatis Humanae for the continuity (and therefore, the
credibility) of the Church’s Magisterium have only been exacerbated since the Council
by many of the most influential attempts at reconciling the old and the new positions.
Rather than resort to superficial and unhistorical attempts to give a liberal
interpretation to the pre-conciliar documents, Catholic scholars should begin to realize
that the final, definitive text promulgated by Vatican II is a good deal more traditional
than Fr. Murray and other “Americanist” theologians (on both sides of the
Atlantic) wanted it to be. The remainder of this article will attempt to summarize the key
points of this essential continuity between the conciliar Declaration and previous
Catholic doctrine.
Dignitatis Humanae: General Hermeneutical Perspective
What needs to be kept constantly in mind in studying this important document is that the Council did not intend to give a complete exposition of Catholic doctrine on the relations between the Church and civil society. For this reason, a failure to restate clearly and in detail some of the traditional points of this doctrine cannot be taken as a renunciation of those points. Of extreme importance is the explanation given to the Council Fathers by Bishop de Smedt in presenting the final draft for their vote on 19 November 1965:
Some fathers affirm that the Declaration does not sufficiently show how our doctrine is not opposed to ecclesiastical documents up till the time of the Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII . . . . As regards the substance of the problem, the point should be made that while the papal documents up to Leo XIII insisted more on the moral duty of public authorities toward the true religion, the recent Supreme Pontiffs, while retaining this doctrine, complement it by highlighting another duty of the same authorities, namely, that of observing the exigencies of the dignity of the human person in religious matters, as a necessary element of the common good. The text presented to you today recalls more clearly (see nos. 1 and 3) the duties of the public authority toward the true religion (officia potestatis publicae erga veram religionem); from which it is manifest that this part of the doctrine has not been overlooked. However, the special object of our Declaration is to clarify the second part of the doctrine of recent Supreme Pontiffs — that dealing with the rights and duties which emerge from a consideration of the dignity of the human person.21
What, precisely, were these “duties of the public authority toward
the true religion,” according to the teaching of Leo XIII and his predecessors? As we
have just seen, the Fathers of Vatican II were officially informed that the new
Declaration was not to be understood as repudiating that teaching, or even overlooking it.
Since we are concerned here with the limited task of showing the non-contradiction between
Dignitatis Humanae and this traditional doctrine, our procedure will be to set out briefly
what we understand to be the principal traditional doctrinal theses which are often seen
as irreconcilable with the Vatican II Declaration. Taking each traditional thesis in turn,
we shall attempt to show that a correct interpretation of Dignitatis Humanae leaves it
“intact,” as is claimed in the preamble (article 1) of the Declaration itself.
It seems reasonable to draw four of these controversial theses from the body of
traditional doctrine on Church and state. They are concerned (respectively) with the
general principle of state or civic recognition of Catholicism as true; with the
state’s right to restrict the propagation of religious and moral error; with the
criterion for applying such restrictions; and with the notion of “tolerance”
towards non-Catholic beliefs on the part of civil authority.
Thesis I: The civitas — the civic community as such —
has a duty to pay public honor to God and to recognize as uniquely true the religion
entrusted by Christ to the Catholic Church.22
Now, Dignitatis Humanae not only does not deny the duty of the civitas to honor God and
the true religion (article 6 clearly leaves this option open by acknowledging
circumstances in which one religion is given “special civil recognition in the
juridical constitution of a State”), but reaffirms that duty explicitly in article 1,
which, as Bishop de Smedt explained in the above citation, must be understood to reaffirm
“the duty of public authority towards the true religion.”
An influential group of conservative Fathers had complained that they could not in
conscience accept the implication of article 6 that state neutrality should be considered
the “normal” situation, with special recognition for Catholicism only in
“particular circumstances.”23 To begin with, their objection did not pay
sufficient attention to the fact that article 6, like the document as a whole, sought to
lay down only a very general principle — one which could reasonably be applied in all
modern countries, not only those with a Catholic majority. Thus, a formula had to be found
which would not exclude the traditional doctrine expressed in our Thesis 1, but which
would at the same time maintain a certain reserve towards state establishment of religion
in general — not only because the liberal wing of the Council Fathers was
unsympathetic towards Catholic establishments, but also because all of the Fathers were
critical of the restrictions imposed on Christians by many Islamic and Buddhist
establishments. More importantly, however, this somewhat inadequate compromise formula in
article 6 is not the Council’s last word on this subject. Precisely because of the
conservative objections to it, the words ac societatum (“and societies”) and
traditionalem were added to the final draft of article 1 in order to give greater
“clarity” to the Declaration as a whole.24 A correct exegesis of the document
must therefore interpret article 6 in the light of article 1, and not vice versa. The
crucial sentence in the final text of article 1, understood in the light of de
Smedt’s official explanation, thus reaffirms Thesis 1. It states that the
Council’s doctrine of religious liberty “leaves intact the traditional Catholic
doctrine regarding the moral duty of men and societies towards the true religion and the
one Church of Christ.”25
Objection: The action of the Holy See since Vatican II, which can be seen as constituting
an authentic interpretation of the conciliar document, does not seem to bear out this
conservative reading of DH. On the contrary, concordat revisions since the Council (in
Italy, Spain, and so on) show that the Vatican has discarded the notion of the
“Catholic State.”
Response: It is necessary to keep several points in mind:
1. One must distinguish between the principle itself of communal, social recognition of
the true religion, and particular historically-determined forms of this recognition. As
traditionally expounded, divine law was not said to require a particular legal expression
of this recognition in written constitutions or concordats (which are a relatively recent
development). A merely de facto (unwritten) recognition of Catholicism’s unique truth
would be sufficient to fulfill the requirements of divine law, as traditionally understood
and taught.
2. When, as in virtually all traditionally Christian societies today, there is a
significant plurality of religious outlooks among citizens, it becomes a question of
pastoral and political prudence as to how strongly the Church ought to insist on this
doctrine, in the practical agreements she makes with particular civil governments. From
the fact that the Church (wisely or unwisely) decides no longer to ask for a clear-cut
implementation of the doctrine of Christ’s social kingship in the traditional manner,
it by no means follows that she has renounced the doctrine itself as a matter of
principle.26
3. The “state” (stato, état, staat, estado, etc.) in modern vernaculars is not
synonymous with the civitas of classical Catholic doctrine. The civitas is basically the
nation itself — the community of citizens. But “state” today often means
something narrower — the public authority or government within the nation. And in
modern democratic societies this public authority is not the juridically sovereign
authority, as it was in monarchies of old. Rather, it is legally subject to the supreme
jurisdiction of the national community as a whole, and carries out only certain limited
functions assigned to it by the latter. To deny that the “state” in this sense
is obliged to assume responsibility for discerning religious truth does not therefore
involve denying the doctrine of Pius IX and Leo XIII. To express that doctrine in terms
more readily applicable to modern democracies, it is enough to say that Catholic citizens
have a duty to apply the principles of their religion in appropriate ways to the public
life of their country. As well as being reaffirmed in article 1 of DH, this duty is also
clearly stated in article 13 of Vatican II’s Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity,
which urges the faithful to “infuse a Christian spirit” not just into the
“mentality and customs” of their country, but also into its “laws and
structures” (leges et structuras).
To see what the Vatican has judged to be a fitting application of DH in a society which is
still more Catholic and less secularized than modern Spain or Italy, it suffices to look
at the concordat of July 2, 1975, between the Holy See and Columbia. It acknowledges the
“nation,” rather than the “state,” as being Catholic in character:
however the “state” (acting as the servant, not the master, of the Columbian
nation) recognizes the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion in a unique way as being
“a fundamental element of the common good, and of the integral development of the
national community.”27
Thesis 2: As a consequence of Thesis 1, civil authority has the
right and duty to protect the true religion by penalizing (to the extent required by the
common good) those who violate religious or moral truth — as known by either natural
reason or positive divine revelation.28
The words placed in parentheses in the above statement of this traditional thesis
are important. Although the Church’s traditional policy was indeed to urge the
repression of public non-Catholic manifestations as such, this was not simply because they
were erroneous, and for no other reason. Rather, it was because non-Catholic
manifestations as such were considered to be a sufficiently serious threat to the common
good as to warrant legal suppression. In other words, error was never supposed to be
repressed simply qua error, but qua threat to the welfare of other citizens, above all
insofar as it was seen to endanger their eternal salvation.29
However, this judgment as to how much repression of error is in fact necessary for the
common good in a Catholic society was not and is not a doctrinal judgment, in which the
Church’s infallibility might come into play. It was a practical policy judgment about
an appropriate means toward another end, and, insofar as the traditional policy —
“no public manifestations of non-Catholic beliefs”— was enshrined in
concordats and other Church documents, it was in effect a norm of ecclesiastical public
law. As such, however, it was mutable in principle, in contrast to the unchangeable, but
less specific, divine law which it was designed to implement, and which we have summarized
as Thesis 2.
Hence, it has been possible and legitimate for the Church to change her practical policy
judgment about the extent to which the common good requires the repression of error, in
light of further reflection on the dignity of the human person, the value of even an
erring conscience, the probable extent of inculpability amongst those in error, and a
greater appreciation of the elements of goodness and truth in other religions (especially
at a time when a far worse rival, atheism in various forms, is stronger than ever before).
Dignitatis Humanae nowhere contradicts Thesis 2; however its authentic interpretation, in
the form of post-conciliar concordats, has embodied a definite change in the way the
Church wishes this aspect of divine law to be implemented. With Vatican II, the Church has
decided that, in evaluating public religious activity, civil authorities should no longer
— not even in “Catholic” societies — regard mere incompatibility with
Catholicism (i.e., without any further aggravating factors) as representing a social evil
serious enough to outweigh the claim to immunity from coercion which arises from the
dignity of the human person and his or her good conscience. Essentially, this type of
change is analogous to the post-conciliar relaxation of Church laws on fasting and
abstinence, which are designed to implement the unchangeable (but very general and
non-specific) divine law which requires us all to practice penance of some sort.
Objection 1: If non-Catholic propaganda must now be permitted even in Catholic societies,
in accordance with DH 6, then any so-called social recognition of Catholicism as the true
religion becomes a mere empty formality. Such a regime will for all practical purposes
manifest that “naturalism” which says that “human society is to be
constituted and governed ... without making any distinction between the true religion and
false religions.” And this is precisely the error condemned by Pius IX in Quanta Cura
3.
Response: This is a non-sequitur. A state can give special favor and protection to the
true religion in various important ways without repressing all public manifestations of
other religions. The Catholic Church may well enjoy special rights in regard to education,
marriage legislation, civic religious ceremonies, chaplaincy services to state
institutions, access to radio and TV, the civil status of her clergy, and (of great
importance) interpreting the natural moral law for purposes of legislation. Many of these
features are evident in the Vatican’s post-conciliar concordat with Colombia.30
Colombia’s present constitution is quite in harmony with Vatican II’s teaching
on religious liberty, but certainly does not embody that “naturalism” condemned
by Pius IX.
Objection 2: Gregory XVI and Pius IX denounced “liberty of conscience (and
worship)” as “madness” (deliramentum). The solemnity and forcefulness of
this language shows that they intended to proclaim this as a matter of unchangeable
doctrine (divine law), not just as a mutable “norm” of ecclesiastical law.
Response: This is quite true. But what they condemned in their encyclicals was a more
extreme and permissive degree of civil liberty than that which Vatican II affirmed as a
human right. Gregory’s encyclical Mirari Vos did not define the “liberty of
conscience” which it condemned, but it was in fact directed in a particular way at
Lamennais, who in this respect followed the French revolutionaries in demanding total
“neutrality” of the state towards religion, and the extreme liberty of
propaganda which flowed from that principle. Pius IX clarified this point in Quanta Cura.
What his predecessor characterized as deliramentum, says Pope Pius, is to be understood as
the following “erroneous opinion” (singular), which is to be taken as a whole,
even though it consists of several components. The quotation marks enclosing it are in the
original text of Quanta Cura (article 3):
Liberty of conscience and of cults (cultum) is the personal right of each and every man
— a right which should be proclaimed and asserted in every well-constituted society;
and citizens have the right to all kinds of liberty (omnimodam libertatem), to be
restrained by no law, whether ecclesiastical or civil: a liberty by which they are enabled
to proclaim openly and publicly their ideas, whatever they may be (suos conceptos
quoscumque), by word of mouth, through the press, or by any other means (sive alia
ratione).31
Since the “religious liberty” affirmed by Dignitatis Humanae is not nearly as
extreme and unqualified as the above notion of “liberty of conscience,” the
condemnation of the latter by Pius IX as contrary to divine law is not contradicted by
Vatican II. To take a simple parallel: the proposition “No one may drive here at 70
m.p.h.” is not contradicted by affirming, “One may drive here at 60 m.p.h.”
Objection 3: Item 77 of Pius IX’s Syllabus, however,32 is a condemnation of the idea
that “it is no longer expedient for Catholicism to be held as the only religion of
the state, to the exclusion of all other cults.”
Response: A careful study of the historical context of this proposition shows that the
Pope intended to condemn here (as contrary to divine law) only a denial of our Thesis 1
(see above).33 The original allocution from which Item 77 was taken has nothing to do with
whether or not non-Catholics may practice their religion publicly.34
Thesis 3: In a well-constituted society, the common good will always
require some restriction of religious and moral error over and above that which is
necessary merely for maintaining public peace.
This thesis, expressed positively, is derived from Pius IX’s condemnation of the
opposed error, which holds that “in the best condition of society, no duty is
recognized by the Government of correcting, by enacted penalties, violators of the
Catholic religion, except when the maintenance of public peace requires it.”35
Archbishop Lefèbvre, however, reads into this passage more than it says, and gives it an
unduly severe interpretation. He says:
Pius IX thus teaches that the State governs in a preferable way when it recognizes the duty of repressing the public exercise of false religions, for the sole reason that they are false, and not only to safeguard public peace.36
The words we have emphasized in Lefèbvre’s commentary are not necessarily implied by the text of Quanta Cura itself, which must be interpreted strictly — especially since it is a condemnation. (In accordance with the maxim odiosa sunt restringenda, the Church leans towards lenient, rather than harsh, interpretations, when it is a question of penalties and condemnations.)
Vatican II’s teachings, therefore, would fall under Pius IX’s
solemn condemnation, quoted above, only if it affirmed “public peace” as the one
and only criterion which governments may appeal to in order to restrict anti-Catholic
propaganda. But this the Council certainly does not do.
To begin with, the notion of “public peace” which Pius IX refers to is that
which resulted from the “naturalism” which he is principally concerned to
condemn in that article (no. 3) of his encyclical. Since the fundamental principle of this
“naturalism” was absolute state neutrality in regard to religion, such a
conception of “public peace” would not even allow for recognition of the
Catholic Church as the authentic interpreter of the natural moral law. And in the absence
of any such objective criterion, “public peace” can be interpreted just as
permissively or repressively as the dominant political authority may happen to decide at
any given time. When Vatican II speaks of restrictions in the interests of “public
peace,” however, it specifies that these must be in accordance with “the
objective moral order” (article 7). And in practice the objective moral order will
not be consistently upheld in social legislation unless the Catholic Church is recognized
(in accordance with DH 1 and all traditional doctrine) as its unique authentic
interpreter.
Furthermore, “public peace” is specified in DH 7 as only one of three criteria
which governments may appeal to in restricting activity touching on religious matters; and
all three, according to the Council, must be applied in accordance with the
“objective moral order.” The other two criteria are “an appropriate
guarding of public morality” and “the effective safeguarding of the rights of
all citizens.” (As an example of religious activity which would “injure”
the rights of others, article 4 mentions anything which “seems to savour of coercion
or of dishonest or unworthy means of persuasion.”) These three criteria taken
together are what the Council means by that “just public order” which it
proposes as the overall norm for state limitations on religious (or anti-religious)
activity. Quite clearly, this norm cannot be identified with the secularist “public
peace” mentioned in Quanta Cura; therefore Vatican II does not contradict Pius IX on
this point.37
Objection 1: Article 6 of DH forbids all “discrimination” on religious grounds.
Surely this implies that the State may not allow the Catholic Church any privileged voice
in advising or deciding what in fact should be seen as a violation of public morality or
of citizen’s rights?38
Response: What this sentence in article 6 forbids is discrimination “among
citizens” on religious grounds, so that “the equality of citizens before the
law” is safeguarded. That does not imply that there can be no state discrimination
between religions as such — something which this same article explicitly permits, as
we saw in discussing Thesis 1. Paul VI confirmed this after the Council, not only in the
concordat with Colombia (see above) but in a 1970 allocution to a congress of civil
lawyers, in which the pope affirmed that human law must be based on the principles of
“the divine law, natural and positive.”39 Thus, the state can
“discriminate” in favor even of certain aspects of revealed truth (e.g., Sunday
observance, prohibition of polygamy). What the Council’s ban on “discrimination
among citizens” is aimed at is the kind of situation where certain people would be
treated as second-class citizens– in regard to voting rights, employment, education,
housing, and so on — simply because of their religion.
Objection 2: The traditional norm for limiting religious propaganda was said to be the
“common good” of society. But DH contradicts this by allowing state restrictions
only in order to protect the “fundamental part” of the common good, not the
common good as a whole. This is what the Declaration says it means by “public
order” (article 7).
Response: This is quite true. But what they condemned in their encyclicals was a more
extreme and permissive degree of civil liberty than that which Vatican II affirmed as a
human right. Gregory’s encyclical Mirari Vos did not define the “liberty of
conscience” which it condemned, but it was in fact directed in a particular way at
Lamennais, who in this respect followed the French revolutionaries in demanding total
“neutrality” of the state towards religion, and the extreme liberty of
propaganda which flowed from that principle. Pius IX clarified this point in Quanta Cura.
What his predecessor characterized as deliramentum, says Pope Pius, is to be understood as
the following “erroneous opinion” (singular), which is to be taken as a whole,
even though it consists of several components. The quotation marks enclosing it are in the
original text of Quanta Cura (article 3):
Liberty of conscience and of cults (cultum) is the personal right of each and every man
— a right which should be proclaimed and asserted in every well-constituted society;
and citizens have the right to all kinds of liberty (omnimodam libertatem), to be
restrained by no law, whether ecclesiastical or civil: a liberty by which they are enabled
to proclaim openly and publicly their ideas, whatever they may be (suos conceptos
quoscumque), by word of mouth, through the press, or by any other means (sive alia
ratione).31
Since the “religious liberty” affirmed by Dignitatis Humanae is not nearly as
extreme and unqualified as the above notion of “liberty of conscience,” the
condemnation of the latter by Pius IX as contrary to divine law is not contradicted by
Vatican II. To take a simple parallel: the proposition “No one may drive here at 70
m.p.h.” is not contradicted by affirming, “One may drive here at 60 m.p.h.”
Objection 3: Item 77 of Pius IX’s Syllabus, however,32 is a condemnation of the idea
that “it is no longer expedient for Catholicism to be held as the only religion of
the state, to the exclusion of all other cults.”
Response: A careful study of the historical context of this proposition shows that the
Pope intended to condemn here (as contrary to divine law) only a denial of our Thesis 1
(see above).33 The original allocution from which Item 77 was taken has nothing to do with
whether or not non-Catholics may practice their religion publicly.34
Thesis 3: In a well-constituted society, the common good will always
require some restriction of religious and moral error over and above that which is
necessary merely for maintaining public peace.
This thesis, expressed positively, is derived from Pius IX’s condemnation of the
opposed error, which holds that “in the best condition of society, no duty is
recognized by the Government of correcting, by enacted penalties, violators of the
Catholic religion, except when the maintenance of public peace requires it.”35
Archbishop Lefèbvre, however, reads into this passage more than it says, and gives it an
unduly severe interpretation. He says:
Pius IX thus teaches that the State governs in a preferable way when it recognizes the
duty of repressing the public exercise of false religions, for the sole reason that they
are false, and not only to safeguard public peace.36
The words we have emphasized in Lefèbvre’s commentary are not necessarily implied by
the text of Quanta Cura itself, which must be interpreted strictly — especially since
it is a condemnation. (In accordance with the maxim odiosa sunt restringenda, the Church
leans towards lenient, rather than harsh, interpretations, when it is a question of
penalties and condemnations.)
Vatican II’s teachings, therefore, would fall under Pius IX’s solemn
condemnation, quoted above, only if it affirmed “public peace” as the one and
only criterion which governments may appeal to in order to restrict anti-Catholic
propaganda. But this the Council certainly does not do.
To begin with, the notion of “public peace” which Pius IX refers to is that
which resulted from the “naturalism” which he is principally concerned to
condemn in that article (no. 3) of his encyclical. Since the fundamental principle of this
“naturalism” was absolute state neutrality in regard to religion, such a
conception of “public peace” would not even allow for recognition of the
Catholic Church as the authentic interpreter of the natural moral law. And in the absence
of any such objective criterion, “public peace” can be interpreted just as
permissively or repressively as the dominant political authority may happen to decide at
any given time. When Vatican II speaks of restrictions in the interests of “public
peace,” however, it specifies that these must be in accordance with “the
objective moral order” (article 7). And in practice the objective moral order will
not be consistently upheld in social legislation unless the Catholic Church is recognized
(in accordance with DH 1 and all traditional doctrine) as its unique authentic
interpreter.
Furthermore, “public peace” is specified in DH 7 as only one of three criteria
which governments may appeal to in restricting activity touching on religious matters; and
all three, according to the Council, must be applied in accordance with the
“objective moral order.” The other two criteria are “an appropriate
guarding of public morality” and “the effective safeguarding of the rights of
all citizens.” (As an example of religious activity which would “injure”
the rights of others, article 4 mentions anything which “seems to savour of coercion
or of dishonest or unworthy means of persuasion.”) These three criteria taken
together are what the Council means by that “just public order” which it
proposes as the overall norm for state limitations on religious (or anti-religious)
activity. Quite clearly, this norm cannot be identified with the secularist “public
peace” mentioned in Quanta Cura; therefore Vatican II does not contradict Pius IX on
this point.37
Objection 1: Article 6 of DH forbids all “discrimination” on religious grounds.
Surely this implies that the State may not allow the Catholic Church any privileged voice
in advising or deciding what in fact should be seen as a violation of public morality or
of citizen’s rights?38
Response: What this sentence in article 6 forbids is discrimination “among
citizens” on religious grounds, so that “the equality of citizens before the
law” is safeguarded. That does not imply that there can be no state discrimination
between religions as such — something which this same article explicitly permits, as
we saw in discussing Thesis 1. Paul VI confirmed this after the Council, not only in the
concordat with Colombia (see above) but in a 1970 allocution to a congress of civil
lawyers, in which the pope affirmed that human law must be based on the principles of
“the divine law, natural and positive.”39 Thus, the state can
“discriminate” in favor even of certain aspects of revealed truth (e.g., Sunday
observance, prohibition of polygamy). What the Council’s ban on “discrimination
among citizens” is aimed at is the kind of situation where certain people would be
treated as second-class citizens– in regard to voting rights, employment, education,
housing, and so on — simply because of their religion.
Objection 2: The traditional norm for limiting religious propaganda was said to be the
“common good” of society. But DH contradicts this by allowing state restrictions
only in order to protect the “fundamental part” of the common good, not the
common good as a whole. This is what the Declaration says it means by “public
order” (article 7).
Response: This is a point which perhaps needs further official clarification. Bishop de
Smedt’s explanations, however, give the impression that no doctrinal change is
intended here: he does not suggest that there is some “part” of the common good
which the state could not protect even if it were seriously attacked. Rather, the point
seems to be that “public order” is a term better adapted to modern law-codes,
which customarily speak of coercive or police activity as the care of “public
order.” All such activity only constitutes part of the care of the common good, for
the whole of which the state in all its branches and activities is responsible.40 In any
case, it seems probable that the precisions given in article 7 of DH in regard to the
limiting criteria on religious activity are to be seen as new norms of ecclesiastical
public law rather than immutable doctrine. The central doctrinal affirmation of the entire
Declaration is found in article 2, which we have quoted over note 8 above. The Council
simply affirms there that there are “due limits” to legitimate religious
activity in civil society; and article 7 then gives a concrete application to this general
doctrinal principle by specifying how the Church in our own day wishes these limits to be
determined by civil governments.
Thesis 4: Civil authority can and should tolerate the diffusion of
religious and moral error to the extent that the common good requires; but it may never
give positive approval or authorization to such activity, since nobody has an objective
moral right to believe or propagate what is false, or to do what is wrong.41
To understand why DH does not contradict this traditional thesis in speaking of
“rights” for non-Catholic as well as Catholic manifestations, it is essential to
appreciate the difference between affirming: (a) a right to propagate error under some
circumstances; and (b) a right to immunity from coercion in propagating error under some
circumstances. To affirm (a) would certainly be to contradict Thesis 4; but Vatican II is
most careful only to affirm (b), and Bishop de Smedt emphasized this to the Council
Fathers in his official explanation of the final draft. The object of the right affirmed
in this document, he stressed, is immunity from coercion, and not the content of this or
that religion . . . . Nowhere is it affirmed– nor could it be truly affirmed, as is
evident — that there is any right to propagate error. [Nullibi affirmatur nec
affirmare licit (quod evidens est) dari ius ad errorem diffundendum.] If people propagate
error, this is not the exercise of a right, but the abuse of a right, which can and should
be restrained if it seriously harms public order, as is affirmed a number of times in the
text and explained in article 7.42
Now, it is true that, for pastoral and ecumenical reasons, DH nowhere uses the word
“tolerate.” But the substantive doctrine of Vatican II could have been
equivalently expressed by saying that non-Catholics can have a right to be tolerated
(i.e., to be immune from government interference) in the practice of their religion.
This idea, and indeed, the very attempt to distinguish between the two kinds of
“rights” characterized as (a) and (b) above, is customarily denounced by our
Lefèbvrist brethren as “sophistry,” “confusion,”
“absurdity,” and so on.43 One such critic has asserted in a letter to this
writer that, quite apart from the question of what “tolerance” means, the right
to practice a religion is “rigorously identical” with the right to immunity from
coercion in practicing it.
Such criticisms are themselves confused. To begin with, they assume that the very notion
of “tolerance” entails not only (i) the permission of something evil, but also
(ii) the right of the tolerating authority to suppress the evil which it has decided to
permit. But while in juridical or legal usage the term “tolerance” may well be
understood to entail both (i) and (ii), its normal, non-technical usage (which is that of
papal encyclicals) does not necessarily entail (ii) as part of the very definition of this
word. There is therefore no intrinsic self-contradiction in the notion of a “right to
be tolerated,” even though not every tolerated evil, of course, could justly claim
such a right.
This becomes clearer if we go beyond the merely semantic question in order to elucidate
the basic point at issue. Those who maintain that our distinction between rights (a) and
(b) above is mere “sophistry” (i.e., those who maintain that a right to immunity
from coercion in doing X necessarily presupposes that X is objectively justifiable) are
really implying the dangerously totalitarian doctrine that the state is in principle
competent to suppress any and every form of objectively wrong behavior.44 They would say
that if at times there is a “duty” for the state to permit some unjustifiable
activity which is being carried out by certain people, this duty can only arise indirectly
from the wider needs of society; it can never be a duty which is owed in strict justice to
those people themselves.
Such a doctrine has consequences which many Lefèbvrists themselves would probably find
embarrassing and disconcerting. It implies, for instance, that since it is objectively
unjustifiable to practice a religion which denies the infallibility and universal
jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, Eastern Orthodox Christians cannot justly claim that
their rights are violated if Moslem dictators close down their churches, confiscate their
printing presses, and so on! The basic error in such a position is this: it forgets that
injustice can be done to a man not only if his good activities are unfairly penalized, but
also if his wrong activities are judged and penalized by someone who is not authorized to
impose such penalties. And it may be that in some circumstances, tolerance of a man’s
objectively wrong behavior may be owed to him in strict justice by the state, simply
because God has reserved to Himself the right to judge such cases.45
Now this is precisely what Vatican II has in mind when it recognizes a “right to
immunity from human coercion” for erring religious activity which does not seriously
harm the good of the society in which it takes place. It is true that the Magisterium had
never explicitly said this before, although Pius XII came close to it in affirming that
sometimes the state has “no right to impede and repress what is erroneous and
false.”46 But the idea was already implicit in Catholic tradition, at least in regard
to “private” activity. Most Catholic traditionalists are prepared to concede
that the state may not justly repress religious activity carried out by non-Catholics
within their own homes. St. Thomas, for instance, taught that the natural right of fathers
precludes Christian rulers from separating Jewish or Moslem children from their parents in
order to save them from false religious teaching.47 But does this not imply the very
distinction which many of these same traditionalists tell us is mere
“sophistry”? The parents in question have no right to believe– much less to
teach– that Christ is not God; but they do have the right to demand tolerance
(non-interference) from the state in teaching this to their children.
Amongst those Catholics who find difficulty in accepting Dignitatis Humanae, the most keenly-felt obstacle usually seems to be a point we have dealt with in discussing Thesis 2, namely the Declaration’s implications regarding the public exercise of non-Catholic religions in predominately Catholic societies. We can only repeat that although the conciliar Church has indeed departed from tradition here, it is essentially a question of discarding a traditional policy, not a traditional doctrine. The fact that there can be a legitimate evolution in the Church’s practical judgment regarding the extent to which error should be restrained by government was emphasized by Bishop de Smedt in explaining the final draft to the Council Fathers. His commentary also helps one to see that Vatican II does not imply a blunt condemnation of the Church’s earlier, more repressive, norm as something intrinsically evil or unjust. In explaining the more traditional treatment of the “common good” in the final draft of article 7, the Bishop said:
Venerable Fathers, this elucidation regarding the common good clarifies many points in the text, and renders a number of other suggested changes unnecessary. Let me give one example. In no. 12 the issue was raised of reprehensible behaviour– behaviour contrary to the spirit of the Gospel– which has sometimes arisen during the history of the People of God. Now, some Fathers wanted us to add that in judging these shortcomings of the past, one should take into account the fact that human society itself has exhibited different modes of thinking and living in different ages. This is quite true, but it is equivalently expressed when we affirm that the norm for the care of religion is the common good. The common good, as everyone knows, is something relative: it is linked to the cultural evolution of peoples and has to be judged according to that development.48
If this overall perspective can be kept in mind, along with the sorts of
specific considerations to which we have drawn attention in this article, then it seems
reasonable to hope that — at least in regard to the religious liberty problem —
the reconciliation which Pope John Paul II calls for in the Motu Proprio Ecclesia Dei will
gradually become a reality. Most helpful of all would be a document from the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith giving an official explanation of the essential continuity
in doctrine between Dignitatis Humanae and traditional teaching.
Fr. Brian Harrison, O.S. is a professor of philosophy and theology at the Pontifical
University of Puerto Rico in Ponce, P.R. This article is adapted from “Vatican II and
Religious Liberty: Contradiction or Continuity?” which appeared in the July/August
1989 Social Justice Review.
Notes
1 Published by John XXIII Fellowship Coop., Melbourne, Australia, 1988
(reviewed by Rev. John H. Miller in Social Justice Review, January-February 1989, 31).
2 Relevant passage in Denzinger-Schönmetzer (DS) 2730, 2731.
3 The Latin text of the relevant passage (no. 3 of the encyclical) can
be found in P. Gasparri (ed.) Codicis Iuris Canonici Fontes. Vol. II (Rome, Typis
Polyglotis Vaticanis, 1924) 994-5.
4 DS 2977.
5 Encyclical Letter Libertas (June 20, 1888) 23.
6 Address to Italian jurists, Ci Riesce, December 6, 1953. Acta
Apostolicae Sedis, 45 (1953) 798.
7 Cf. AAS 45 (1953) 626, 651-52. The Spanish law confirmed here is cited
in Minnerath, R. La Doctrine de Vatican II sur la liberté religieuse. Diss. Laur.,
Facultar Iuris Canonici. Rome, Pontifical Gregorian University, 1980, p. 48, note 43.
8 DH 2.
9 A much better, more traditional, explanation of the harmony between
Vatican II and tradition was given during and immediately after the Council by Victorino
Rodriguez, O.P. in two articles in La Ciencia Tomista: “Sobre la libertad
religiosa” Vol. 91 (1964) 311-429; and “Estudio histórico-doctrinal de la
declaración sobre libertad religiousa del Vaticano II” (Vol. 93 (1966) 193-339). It
is a pity that these articles were never translated into other languages for the benefit
of those outside the Hispanic world.
10 “La Doctrine de la liberté religieuse est-elle contraire à la
révélation chrétienne et à la Tradition de l’Eglise?” in Documents
Episcopat, Bulletin of French Episcopal Conference, no. 15, October 1986.
11 Ibid. p. 15 (translation by present writer).
12 “Sesbouë S.J. e la libertà religiosa: ‘dottrina
cattolica’ o deliramento?” Si Si No No. 28 Feb. 1987, p. 3.
13 Acta Synodalia Sacr. Conc. Oec. Vat. II (AS). Rome, Typis Polyglottis
Vaticanis, Vol. II, part V (1976) 491.
14 Cf. Harrison, Religious Liberty and Contraception. 34-37, for an
exposition of Lamennais’ position.
15 The “absurd and erroneous” demand for “liberty of
conscience,” says Pope Gregory, “ex hoc putidissimo indifferentismi fonte . . .
fluit” (DS 2730).
16 Greogry quotes St. Augustine (Epistle 105, ch. 2 § 10, to the
Donatists) as teaching that “liberty for error” spells “death to the
soul” (DS 2731).
17 Cf. Harrison, op. cit. 147-62, for a detailed exposition and critique
of Murray’s thesis.
18 Ibid., 148-49.
19 In a recent article setting out to answer French traditionalist
criticisms of DH, Fr. René Coste, S.J., for instance, appears to take it for granted that
state neutrality or secularity as an ideal norm is doctrinally quite acceptable,
apparently not realizing that such an idea lies at the very heart of Archbishop
Lefèbvre’s objections to what is (supposedly) taught by the Council. Cf. “Vers
une élucidation du développment de la doctrine catholique concernant la liberté
religieuse.” Esprit et Vie, 1988. No. 35-36, pp. 465-477. Murray’s thesis, in
fact, appears to have become the common teaching of the Society of Jesus.
20 Cf. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei (1885) 6, 35; Pius IX, Syllabus, 77; Pius
XI, Quas Primas, 32.
21 AS, Vol. IV, Part VI (1978) 719.
22 Cf. Leo XIII, Encyclical Longinqua (1895) 6; Pius XI, Encyclical Quas
Primas (1925) 32.
23 Cf. Ralph M. Wiltgen, The Rhine Flows Into the Tiber (British ed.,
Augustine Publishing Co., Devon, 1978) 251.
24 AS, Vol. IV, Part VI, 731. (Cf. MM 28-29 and response.)
25 Emphasis is added here to the words inserted in the final draft.
26 Cf. Gaudium et Spes (76): The Church “is prepared to give up the
exercise of certain legitimate rights whenever it becomes clear that their use will
compromise the sincerity of its witness, or whenever new circumstances call for a renewed
approach” (emphasis added). Thus, the rights themselves are not given up.
27 AAS, 67 (1975) 422.
28 Cf. Pius IX, Quanta Cura, 3; Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, 32; Libertas,
23, 25-27.
29 Cf. Immortale Dei, 32; Mirari Vos (DS 2731).
30 Cf. AAS 67 (1975) 422-431, especially Articles I, II, VI, VII, VIII,
XI, XII, XVII, XIX, XX, XXI, and XXII.
31 Emphasis added.
32 DS 2977.
33 Cf. Harrison, op. cit. 53-61.
34 Cf. Allocution Nemo vestrum (26 July 1855), which denounces the
harassment of the Church by the “liberal” regime in Spain. (Text in Les Actes
Pontificaux [Paris, 1865] pp. 278-285.)
35 Quanta Cura, 3.
36 Ils L’Ont Découronné (Escurolles: Editions Fideliter, 1987)
205 (present writer’s translation, emphasis added).
37 Cf. Harrison, op. cit. 102-111 for fuller treatment.
38 A. de Lassus, La liberté religieuse (Paris, Action Familiale et
Scolaire, 1988) raises this objection on pp. 41-43.
39 Allocution of 24 September 1970, Insegnamenti di Paolo VI, Vol. VIII
(Rome: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1970) 912.
40 Cf. Harrison, op. cit. 89-95 for full details and quotes.
41 Cf. Immortale Dei, 36; Libertas, 33-34; Ci Riesce (AAS 45 (1953)
798-99).
42 AS, Vol. IV, Part VI, 725.
43 Cf., for example, M. Lefèbvre, “Dubia” sur la Liberté
Religieuse, Ecône, 1987, 16-17.
44 This is by no means the teaching of St. Thomas, who answers
negatively to the question, “Whether it belongs to human law to repress all
vices” (cf. Summa Theologica, I-II 96 2).
45 Cf. the Gospel parable of the wheat and the tares (Mt 13:24-30).
46Ci Riesce, loc. cit. emphasis added.
47Summa Theologica, II-II 10 12.
48AS, Vol. IV, Part VI, 723, note 15.