Dossier

One Nation, Two Cultures

New alliances with other countries have sharpened an old conflict between two separate societies in northern and southern Sudan.

"The Sudanese government is weak; they can only rule by force, and force is not the best way to rule a country." So says Akolda Tier, a professor at Khartoum University.

The members of the clique currently holding power in Khartoum are fond of the describing their political movement as an "Islamic revolution." It is difficult to measure the level of their popular support, but whatever genuine support they do enjoy comes only from a small privileged group of "pure" Arabs; the rest of the Sudanese are not even allowed full citizenship.

What is certain is that the government has an effective secret-police network, and enforces the coercive Shari'a law with its terrifying sanctions. This adds up to a reign of terror, for the predominantly Arabic and Muslim people in the north as much as the black Christians and animists living the south--though the style of oppression is different in the two regions.

Recent signs indicate that the tensions of Sudan are increasing. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, apparently with the support of American aid (although that aid is officially nonexistent), has increased his support for the rebels attacking Sudanese troops from the south and west, from bases in Uganda and Zaire. The rebels in southern Sudan who had already been fighting against the regime have allied with groups in Ethiopia and Eritrea, attacking from the east.

In response to these new threats from abroad, the Sudanese government is relying heavily on Iran and other allies for military aid (although the existence of this aid, too, is routinely denied). With these pressures so far balancing each other, the progress of rebels on all fronts has been sporadic; measured against the vast territory of Sudan, there has been little progress. Nevertheless the conflicting forces continue to grow in strength, so a long and inconclusive civil war is growing into the proportions of an international crisis. That escalation in itself makes it more likely that there will soon be more dramatic changes.

The larger scale of the conflict has brought more involvement by international organizations. The southern rebels have tried to draw international attention to the plight of the Nuba mountain people, who have been besieged by the Sudan regime and prevented from supporting themselves; they are now starving in "peace camps." The UN has proposed air sanctions on Sudan, but that idea seems to have been effectively neutralized by the clever use of refugees as a kind of diplomatic human shield: deny us air supplies, say Sudan's leaders, and it is the refugees who will ultimately suffer from want of supplies. And so the killing continues.

Sudan bridges the worlds of northern and central Africa. The largest country in the continent, the meeting place of the Blue and White Niles, it has huge human and agricultural potential. Its 26 million people form nearly 20 ethnic groups.

The war that is now sapping this country's energies is usually portrayed in a simplified way as a struggle between the Arabic and Islamic north against insurrection from the African Christian and pagan south. That picture may capture the broadest geographical features of the struggle, but a more detailed look reveals forces that are more significant than those of territorial conflict. This is very much a war of faiths, and the resistance of many ordinary people in the besieged areas cannot be explained except in terms of their determination not to abandon Christianity.

Sudan has the oldest Christian foundation of any country in sub-Saharan Africa; it is often forgotten that the Church was there long before Islam existed. The first baptism of a Sudanese is recorded in the Acts of the Apostles: the eunuch baptized by Philip was from Nuba, an area of Sudan (the term "Ethiopian" is used in the passage in only a vague sense). But if he had spiritual offspring, no records of them remain. The evangelization of the area had to wait until the 4th century, when again it was the Nubian people--the people of Nuba--who had contact with Egyptian Copts. Two centuries later, there were three Christian kingdoms in the north, thanks to missionaries from Byzantium.

Sudan is unique in Africa for having resisted Arabic invasion for generations--unlike its neighbors, which quickly fell under the sway of the new religion after the effective foundation of Islam in 620. Arabic efforts to invade Sudan met stiff resistance, and the would-be Islamic conquerors had to settle for a non-aggression pact with the native Kushitic people. Thus the Christian kingdoms along the

Nile co-existed with their Muslim neighbors until the end of the Middle Ages.

Testimony to the strength of Christianity in the 9th and 10th centuries only came to light with the preparations for the Aswan Dam; the remains of basilica and churches, and even a list of the first 33 bishops were found. But that Church, however vigorous, was almost entirely supported by missionaries; the Church of that era lacked native clergy. Much later, in 1864, Blessed Daniel Comboni had the inspiration of "planting the Church in Africa with Africans themselves as protagonists", and worked to foster native vocations. His work bore fruit, and by the time of independence in 1956 the country had 60 churches, a major seminary, and three minor seminaries.

By the end of the Middle Ages, the Christian kingdoms had collapsed, while the small Arabic states grew in strength. Now began a period in which small centralized political elites would enrich themselves at the expense of outlying areas. Only people who took on an Arab identity were allowed to prosper, and ethnic and religious origin determined status. State-organized raids on the rural regions produced an important economic commodity: the captives taken were then either used as soldiers or sold abroad as slaves. The tradition of taking slaves has continued to this day; now, as then, it is seen as having a useful side-effect of demoralizing the non-Arab whom the government seeks to hold under its subjection.

In the 19th century, the area was conquered by a Turko-Egyptian force, which compelled the Arabic states to unite. Until that time southward expansion had been blocked by the Dinka and Shilluk tribes; today the northern limit of the territory once ruled by these peoples still defines the ad-hoc line which divides between northern and southern Sudan. Villages in this region often change hands, depending on whether seasonal conditions favor the guerrilla-style Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) or the mechanized troops of the Sudanese government.

It was partly as a reaction to the competition among European colonial forces in the 19th century that more radical Islamic movements arose in the Africa region. In 1885 Ahmed Al-Mahdi, a charismatic spiritual as well as military leader, rallied the Islamic malcontents against British rule and captured Khartoum. Although in 1898 an alliance of British and Egyptian forces ousted the Islamic government, this "Mahdist" movement inaugurated a tendency which has culminated in the totalitarian state represented by the present Sudan government.

Throughout the 19th century, the different governments which ruled Sudan made little effort to develop the south; the reach of their authority stretched no further than was necessary for the development of food and cash crops. But even under that lax rule, there were efforts toward independence; the tensions that define the country today were already clearly drawn. Those tensions were clearly visible at the foundation of contemporary Sudan. By the time the country gained its independence in 1956, rebel movements in the south were already in action; they had declared war a year earlier. And as they proclaimed independence, the new rulers in Khartoum took office under the slogan of "one country, one religion, one language." That slogan of course indicated their plan for total integration of the south on Khartoum's terms: Islamic religion and Arabic language.

A year after independence, the country's official day of rest was changed from Sunday to Friday, and schools in the south, including all missionary schools, were taken under government control. Twenty-three priests who protested the measure were expelled. In 1992 the Missionary Act set government limits on pastoral activities, and by 1994 some 400 priests and missionaries had been deported.

When Col. Jafaar al-Nimeiri took power in 1969, the outlook for non-Muslim Sudanese improved. Regional autonomy was granted to the south, and respect for Christian beliefs was written into a new constitution. But by 1983 yet another rebellion had broken out in the south, because Nimeiri had failed to enforce the new rights which he had promised. In fact, Nimeiri's policies were was driven by two major factors: the desire to develop the newly discovered mineral wealth of the south, and the pressure from the radical Islamist clique led by al-Turabi. The latter group continues to be the de facto power in Sudan today, behind the new military government of Hassan al-Bashir.

The revolution of 1983 was a complete rout for the south. The region's provincial government was abolished, and Islamic Shari'a law was imposed: the lash for immorality, the suppression of women's rights, amputation for theft, and--perhaps most important for Christians--execution for conversion from Islam. Since that time some "apostates" to Christianity have been executed by crucifixion.

Now, with the aid of Iran, the Sudanese government is waging an explicit "holy war" against the southern rebels. For the inhabitants of the south, the result is a total disruption of their life. Alongside the brutality of the killing itself, the war destroyed agricultural trade networks, causing widespread famine.

Even in times of relative peace for southern Sudan, ill-conceived agricultural schemes installed by the British colonial rulers had proved financially disastrous, and displaced a traditional agricultural system which had been perfectly adequate to feed the native population. The British failures had led to the displacement of a large proportion of the population in the south. Now the bitter warfare being carried on today means that literally millions of people have fled their homes. Many of these displaced families have taken refuge on the outskirts of cities in the north, fearful almost as much of the rebels of the south as the government's soldiers.

Such mass movement not only produces the squalor that is the stock-in-trade of news providers covering Africa, but also causes enormous difficulties for the Church's pastoral work. Even if the people in camps had the means to set up a church building, the freedom to do so is forbidden them; if priests (who are already in short supply in the south) were ever allowed near a camp, they would soon find their energies exhausted by the demand for the most basic human services.

Meanwhile the Sudanese government is engaged in a new campaign, moving people from the slums around the cities into specially built camps far out in the wilderness. Ostensibly this effort is being carried out for the refugees' own good and protection, but government officials are finding it hard to explain how setting up the camps in the most arid possible areas, and separating families, can possibly serve their welfare. Meanwhile the women and children in their segregated camps continue to be exploited, in ways that are best not described, by those supposedly protecting them.

Although their life under the current Khartoum regime is undoubtedly harsh, it is difficult to imagine how the people of the south might fare if the SPLA rebels were to win the civil war. John Garang, the SPLA leader, insists that his fighters are well-disciplined, and that tough discipline is meted out for rebel soldiers who abuse civilians. Others tell a different story. Certainly it seems logical that only a very brutal threat at home could force refugees to travel into the hands of the government in the north.

Garang believes that independence for the south would enable its society to obtain the conditions they need for peaceful development. However, like his colleagues Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Paul Kagame in Rwanda, and Laurent Kabila in eastern Zaire, Garang is an inveterate fighter, who has never had the opportunity or shown the inclination to develop a clear conception of what peaceful government would involve. None of those African leaders has ever presented a compelling program for peaceful development.

Like Museveni, Garang places his fundamental belief is in the power of the gun. But unlike Museveni he does not enjoy direct foreign support, and there is not been enough coordination among the scattered rebel groups in southern Sudan to mount a concerted military campaign, much less to form a unified government.

In the absence of clear political goals, a southern success in lifting Khartoum's authority could well lead to fratricidal infighting: a frequent problem among rebel alliances once the common enemy is defeated. As an alternative, a newly independent southern Sudan might easily become a part of Uganda. (In colonial times it very nearly did.) Uganda's President Museveni--who has already turned Rwanda into a virtual province of his country--seems to be moving precisely toward that end.

Such might be the best fate for southern Sudan, under the present circumstances. Uganda has enjoyed relative peace and prosperity, and Museveni is shrewd enough to disguise his militaristic style. Unlike the Khartoum government, he does not threaten religious freedoms directly. Finally, such a development would once again allow the Church to develop in southern Sudan, through clergy and missionaries from Uganda's dynamic Catholic Church. And this way Blessed Daniel Comboni's vision would be realized: his beloved Sudanese people evangelized by its own African Church.

Ultimately people will only sacrifice for a belief, and a country can only survive in the long term if founded on sound beliefs. This does not make the anguish of the southern Sudanese less difficult, but it gives them more hope that when eventually a civilization settles peacefully in the region, it is more likely to be Christian than Islamic.

Ben Kobus writes from London for Resolution Africa.

A Vision of the African Church

From his earliest years Daniel Comboni vowed to spend his life spreading the Gospel in central Africa. Born in Italy in 1831, he died in Khartoum, fifty years later. He was beatified last year March 17.

Comboni was a pioneer when the missions were barely surviving in Africa. Today 90 percent of the bishops and priests of the continent are of African origin, and the number of Catholics has soared from only 3.2 million in 1927 to 90 million today.

At the age of 17 Comboni joined a missionary institute founded by Father Nicholas Mazza, at a time when colonial conquests led to the expectation that more territories would soon be opened up to the missions. Soon reports brought from missionaries in Africa filled him with zeal to evangelize there.

In 1854 he was ordained and three years later was in Sudan. He followed the Nile deep into the south of the country. He wrote to his parents, "We shall have to get exhausted, to sweat, to die; but the idea of sweating and dying for love of Jesus Christ and for the salvation of the most abandoned souls in the world is too sweet for us to leave aside the great task."

At the deathbed of a fellow missionary, Comboni strengthened his resolve, crying, "Africa or death!". But because of the huge cost in terms of missionary lives, Propaganda Fide began to feel that missions in Africa could not succeed, and handed over the African region to the apostolic vicariate of Egypt.

Comboni, back in Italy, would not give up his resolve so easily. In 1864, while praying at St. Peter's tomb, he had an insight that led him to write his "Plan for the regeneration of Africa," with its simple theme: "Saving Africa by means of Africa." He saw that the only way for the Church to grow and achieve maturity was for the whole Church, laymen as well as clerics, to take part in the effort, and above all for Africans themselves to be actively involved. He was anticipating what Pope Paul VI would say in Kampala, Uganda one hundred years later: "Now, it is you Africans who are the evangelists of Africans."

With encouragement from Pope Pius IX, Comboni carried out many journeys in Europe to encourage the missionary effort and to raise material and spiritual support. The death of Nicholas Mazza was an unexpected blow: his successor decided to drop the African missions. Comboni would have to start his own foundation, which became the Verona Institute of Combonian Missionaries. He also founded an institute for women religious, the first nuns to go to Africa.

At the first Vatican Council in 1870, Comboni succeeded in getting 70 bishops to sign a petition in favor of evangelizing central Africa. In May of that year the Holy See reopened the Mission for Central Africa and entrusted the largest apostolic vicariate in the world to his institute; it was given nearly two million square miles--an area more than half the size of the entire European continent--to evangelize. In 1877 Comboni himself was made apostolic vicar of Central Africa--at the time of the first scramble for Africa, when European powers were planning how to carve up the continent.

Comboni fought slavery by founding three missions specially for slaves in El Obeid in the south of Sudan. He was also involved in a plan to abolish slavery in Nuba, a region at this moment heavily oppressed by the Khartoum regime.

On his deathbed Comboni encouraged his missionaries, "I am dying, but my work will never die." When he died on October 10, 1881, there were 34 Combonian priests and 22 Combonian nuns. Today the priests' Institute has 1,857 members, including 14 bishops, and the sisters' Institute has 1,896 members.

Moreover, Africa has its own clergy and hierarchical structure. A few years ago Kenya and several other countries in Africa officially ceased to be mission territory. Henceforth missionaries would come out of Africa to re-evangelize Europe.