|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
News- Peru
The End of Cocaine?
Falling price may signal a crisis for drug producers, and an
opportunity for government actions to wipe out a deadly industry
By Alejandro Bermudez
The long dominance of the drug-trafficking business in Latin America
could be reaching to its end. But that scenario would require
the leaders of cocaine-producing countries in the region to take
advantage of an unexpected situation: the dramatic drop of the
international price of the coca leave and its derivatives.
Thus far, the changes in the international drug market have not
been visible at the buyers' end; demand remains strong. But the
economic shifts in this unique industry have transformed the business
for producers and intermediaries that, in the foreseeable future,
some very important changes may be felt throughout the chain of
underground markets that brings the drug from growers in Latin
America to consumers in the developed world, especially the United
States.
In the short term, the unexpected drop in coca prices has produced
a negative social impact in the producing countries. A sharp drop
in personal income has created an economic crisis, and the first
warning signs of social unrest, in coca-growing regions such as
the Upper Huallaga Valley in the Peruvian jungle or the Chapare
Valley in Bolivia, where thousands of families produce the coca
leave for a living. Late last year, a great number of coca farmers
of the Upper Huallaga Valley organized regional strikes, demanding
President Alberto Fujimori to increase the government's social
spending in their region. The strikers demanded that the government
must somehow compensate local communities for the income lost
when the coca price fell.
The spectacular profits available to farmers willing to harvest
coca had, over the years, given growers a taste for personal wealth--in
a region traditionally afflicted by poverty. Now these same farm
families have been plunged into poverty. In fact, those who concentrated
exclusively on coca have found that their market has entirely
disappeared. The 20,000 tons of coca leaves legally cultivated
in Peru are more than enough to cover the actual needs of the
two million consuming Peruvians--mainly peasants and miners who
chew the leave (an ancient habit that is equated to smoking)--as
well as chemical laboratories and coca tea producers. But the
remaining150,000 tons of coca leave tons which have been produced
each year in the region to supply international drug traffickers
have now been completely wasted. Those leaves were left to rot
in the fields, or putrefy in their clandestine jungle storehouses.
Bolivian coca growers have faced a similar situation. On December
1995, hundreds of women from the Chapare Valley marched toward
the capital city of La Paz, ostensibly demanding a change in government
social policy. In their subtle way, the marchers were actually
demanding an end to the government's efforts (with US support)
to eradicate the crop, and a new policy which would support a
better price.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT
But the fall in prices has a far brighter side. The drop in the
price of the coca leave opens up the first serious opportunity
in years for an orchestrated campaign to promote alternative crops
and thus dramatically reduce--if not yet end--the drug-trafficking
business in the region. According to Peruvian Drug Enforcement
Police, in October 1995 the price of one kilogram (2.2 pounds)
of cocaine base paste decreased from $600 to $150. The price of
the coca leave arroba--11.5 kilograms--also dropped, from
an average of $60 to $80 to between $2 and $4 in the last months.
The plunge in prices has been so dramatic that coca is no longer
the most profitable crop farmers can raise. Products such as coffee,
pineapple, cacao, and achiote (an aromatic and coloring herb)
can now be far more profitable.
The Peruvian Agriculture Minister, Absalon Vasquez, explains that
an investment in infrastructure such as roads, airports, electric
power, and efficient irrigation systems could dramatically expand
the number of profitable products. Those developments would be
especially useful in allowing farmers to produce and market fruits,
which are in heavy demand in the American, Japanese, and European
markets, but cannot be produced successfully without advanced
irrigation and efficient means of transporting the product to
market.
Analaysts caution that the reasons for the dramatic fall in prices
are temporary; the prices will remain low only if authorities
in the region pounce on their opportunity. One main cause of the
disruption in the cocaine market has been the dismantling of the
Colombian drug cartels based in Medellin and Cali, which in turn
has led to the series of bloody battles among the lesser drug
merchants scrambling for position to step into the vacuum. With
one set of buyers leaving the market, and another distracted by
warfare, coca farmers have seen a drop in the demand for their
product.
Another key factor has been a newly reorganized fight against
the drug traffic in Peru. President Fujimori introduced a new
strategy, learned in part during his government's successful campaign
against the "Shining Path" terrorist organization. His
administration has concentrated on fighting corruption in the
drug-enforcement agencies, and striking its most powerful blows
against the centers of the drug-trafficking Mafia. Special police
forces, relying heavily on intelligence work, have sought to identify
and capture the leaders of the Mafia cartels--known as "churches"
in the region--and disrupt the transportation routes that link
the leaders with their production bases.
This policy bore real fruit in 1995. The Peruvian police captured
and destroyed the complex commercial structure of Demetrio Chavez
Penaherrera, known as "The Vatican" because of his control
over the "churches." Also successfully crushed were
Abelardo Cachique Rivera, number two on the list of Peruvian drug
barons, and the Lopez Paredes family, the most important providers
of the rising Mexican cartels of Guadalajara and Sinaloa.
At the same time, Peruvian air force has been methodically capturing
or destroying the numerous airplanes that once were used for quick
flights to Colombia or Brazil. This surveillance policy has been
highly successful thanks to radars and AWACs planes provided by
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). One single
flight could move nearly one ton of washed coca paste.
PROBLEMS THAT REMAIN
These successes in the fight against drug trafficking still leave
unanswered the question of how government can address the plight
of 200,000 Peruvian families, and another 70,000 in Bolivia, who
have fallen below the poverty line. At present, neither Peru nor
Bolivia has the financial resources necessary to develop efficient
global programs to promote alternative crops--let alone to furnish
the coca-growing peasant families with the standard of life they
had come to enjoy. Even the substitution policy at the Chapare
Valley in Bolivia, where the United States invested heavily in
roads, water, and electric installations, has not proven successful;
coca farmers are not willing to accept harder work for lower income,
even if the new work--unlike the old--is legal.
But the level of government investment in such programs is also
a question of political options. Peru's Jaime Yoshiyama, the Minister
of the Presidency--a "super minister" responsible for
Fujimori's special projects--has said that the government will
invest heavily in the infrastructure needed to make other products
commercially viable. (That policy leaves other important factors--such
as the prices of altenative crops--subject to marketplace forces.)
At the same time the Peruvian government will continue its energetic
campaign against drug trafficking, to ensure that coca prices
stay down.
Nevertheless, Peru's campaign against drugs will not be totally
successful if it is not coordinated with similar campaigns in
other countries. Fujimori insists, reasonably enough, that drug
traffic in the region can only be defeated if the big distributors,
who buy the raw material from coca farmers and produce refined
cocaine, are also subjected to intense law-enforcement pressure.
Today those distributors, once concentrated almost exclusively
in Colombia, are now waxing powerful in Mexico. But the most serious
effort must be made by consuming countries, mainly the United
States, whose permanent demand for cocaine keeps the drug wheel
spinning. Alejandro Bermudez Rosell writes for ACI-PRENSA in Lima, Peru. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||