questions answered

by wm. b. smith

The “Gospel”(?) of Tolerance

    Question: It seems that the only operative virtue in American life is the virtue of tolerance. Where does this stand in Catholic tradition?

    Answer: Webster’s (2nd unabridged, 1979) Dictionary defines “tolerance” as: “being tolerant of other’s views, beliefs, practices”; with the politically correct addition: “freedom from bigotry or prejudice.”

    In the conventional, Dictionary of Moral Theology (1962) pp. 1236-7, P. Palazzini writes that “tolerance” indicates a stance that permits, for a proportionately good reason, an evil or improper situation of a person. In the practical order, the evil is some vice; in the intellectual order it is an error that is allowed to exist without positive approval.

    To refrain from opposing any doctrine, on the basis that all doctrines are equally good, is called dogmatic tolerance; whereas, a passive attitude concerning erroneous opinions, without approving the error, is called practical tolerance. For Palazzini, dogmatic tolerance is not licit since it is and flows from dogmatic or moral relativism. Practical tolerance can be permitted for good and serious reasons. It is still true that error or evil have no objective right to be promoted or pursued, but the failure to impede error, by law or coercion, can be justified in the interest of a higher and greater good (practical tolerance).

    As your question notes, the modern rhetoric and advocates of “tolerance” present it as the central social virtue, if not the only virtue of contemporary life. The conventional Catholic understanding is more modest, more nuanced and greatly limited.

    St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, who presents the whole of his moral teaching within the framework of the virtues (i.e., the Second Part of his Summa theologiae) does not list “tolerance” as a special or central virtue at all. His singular treatment of it is within the general categories of the consequences of the virtue of faith—the specific question being: “Are the rites of infidels to be tolerated?” (ST, II-II, q. 10, a. 11).

    The Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992) is rather careful in its four mentions of “tolerance”: CCC #1737, re tolerating the evil effect in the Double Effect analysis; CCC #2279, a double effect application wherein the use of painkillers (where death is not willed) might shorten days of life; CCC #2338, that integral chastity tolerates neither a double life nor duplicity of speech; and, CCC #2383 where civil divorce can be tolerated when it is the only way to insure other important and just legal rights.

    Clearly, the traditional Catholic understanding of “tolerance” is not the panacea and all-inclusive trump card so favored by contemporary advocates of evil and abberrant behavior. Strangely, some who are the most absolute about the relativism of all morals have invented their own revelation—the new “Gospel of Tolerance”! Should anyone question or critique the behavior of anyone else that immediately makes you a prejudiced bigot. Gilbert Chesterton’s quip is not far off the moral mark—tolerance is the favorite virtue of those who don’t believe in anything.

    It remains, of course, true that the real Christian gospel directs us: “to do the truth in love” (Eph. 4:15) and “do not be conquered by evil but conquer evil with good” (Rom 12:21).

    Nevertheless, the secular “gospel” of tolerance is not just an elite media sound-bite but a serious obstacle to rebuilding a “Culture of Life” as Pope John Paul II carefully analyzes and explains in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (1995).

    In Chapter III of Evangelium Vitae, when detailing the correct relationship between civil law and the moral law (EV, nn. 68-74), the Pope notes carefully: “At the basis of all these tendencies lies the ethical relativism which characterizes much of present-day culture. There are those who consider such relativism an essential condition of democracy, inasmuch as it alone is held to guarantee tolerance, mutual respect between people and acceptance of the decisions of the majority, whereas moral norms considered to be objective and binding are held to be authoritarianism and intolerance. But it is precisely the issue of respect for life which shows what misunderstandings and contradictions, accompanied by terrible practical consequences, are concealed in this position” (EV, n. 70).

    The Pope honestly admits that some crimes have been committed in the name of truth. “But equally grave crimes and radical denials of freedom have also been committed and are still being committed in the name of ‘ethical relativism’.” When a parliamentary or social majority decrees that it is legal, at least under certain conditions, to kill unborn human life, is it not really making a “tyrannical” decision with regard to the weakest and most defenseless of human beings? Everyone’s conscience rightly rejects those crimes against humanity of which our century has had such sad experience. But would these crimes cease to be crimes if, instead of being committed by unscrupulous tyrants, they were legitimated by popular consensus? (EV, n. 70).

    Democracy, the Pope teaches, is not a substitute for morality nor a panacea for immorality. Fundamentally, democracy is a means not an end and “the value of democracy stands or falls with the values which it embodies or promotes” (Centesimus Annus [5/1/99]) n. 46; also, EV, n. 70).

    The basis of sound values cannot be provisional, temporary, ad hoc and changeable majority opinions. There must be some objective moral law (natural law), some obligatory point of reference for the civil law itself. Otherwise, given contemporary skepticism about truth and objective morality, in the name of democracy we will undermine democracy itself by relativising the most fundamental, even inalienable, human rights.

    “First and fundamental among these is the inviolable right to life of every innocent human being” (EV, n. 71). Public authority can never presume to legitimize as a “right” what is, in fact, an offense and crime against another person. “The legal toleration of abortion or of euthanasia can in no way claim to be based on respect for the consciences of others, precisely because society has the right and the duty to protect itself against the abuses which can occur in the name of conscience and under the pretext of freedom” (EV, n. 71).

    As ever, a constant teaching of John Paul II is not to separate freedom from truth (cf. Veritatis Splendor [1993] nn. 28-34; Freedom and Law, nn. 35-53; Conscience and Truth, nn. 54-64). “Truth and freedom either go hand in hand or together they perish in misery” (Fides et Ratio [9/14/98] n. 89). This is a constant teaching from his first encyclical, Redemptor hominis (1979) n. 12, to his latest encyclical, Fides et Ratio (1998) n. 89.

    Uncritical tolerance is not the essence of democracy, it may well be the destruction of it.

Worthy reception of Communion?

    Question: A long admired Catholic friend, late in life, joined the Society of St. Pius X of Archbishop Lefebvre. When he died, together with several of his old Roman Catholic friends I attended his funeral. To my amazement, many of my Roman Catholic friends received Communion at the funeral and later told me I was wrong not to receive. Is there any relevant law or opinion on this?

    Answer: I think there is. First, there is no law that requires everyone attending every funeral to receive Communion every time (except for priest celebrants).

    Next, I understand the Society of St. Pius X to be at least in practical schism if not formal schism. Thus, I think Canon 844, #2 applies: “Whenever necessity requires or a genuine spiritual advantage commends it, and provided the danger of error or indifferentism is avoided, Christ’s faithful for whom it is physically or morally impossible to approach a Catholic minister, may lawfully receive the sacraments of penance, the Eucharist and anointing of the sick from non-catholic ministers in whose Churches these sacraments are valid” (cn. 844, #2).

    The paragraph of that Canon is normally understood to refer to the Orthodox (non-catholic) ministers whose sacraments are valid. While the Lefebvrites claim to be Catholic, they are not Catholics in good standing, they are schismatic Catholics.

    Surely, attendance at a funeral creates no necessity nor spiritual advantage and the danger of error, indifferentism and scandal are present in such full sacramental participation by Roman Catholics. No hint of physical or moral impossibility exists since your letter says you are a priest and attended with some other priests in good standing.

    Devout attendance at the funeral of an admired friend should not involve us in contradictory practice and scandal—as if it does not matter at all who is and who is not at odds with Church law.

    I suspect they used Canon One at the funeral in Latin. In that Canon, there is a commemoration of the living that specifically mentions the Pope by name. It seems to me more than odd that anyone would mention the Pope in a living commemoration while disobeying the same Pope in practice. Indeed, if that Society would honor, respect and obey the Pope there would be no reason for the Society of St. Pius X to exist.

    In my opinion, practicing Roman Catholics should not exhibit contradictory witness lest they contribute, even unwittingly, to further and deeper indifferentism.

Correction: In the May 1999 Q/A (p. 70), I mistakenly listed the W. E. May book (2nd updated revision) Catholic Sexual Ethics as published in 1988. The title and updated revision are correct, but the correct date is 1998! I apologize for the error, it was my typo not the editor’s.

Please address questions to Msgr. Wm. B. Smith, St. Joseph’s Seminary, Dunwoodie, Yonkers, N.Y. 10704. 

Back to Homiletic & Pastoral Review August/September 1999 Table of Contents

Back to Catholic information Center on Internets Main Periodical Page